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101 S.Ct. 1245
450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493
(Cite as: 450 U.S. 544,101 S.Ct. 1245)

[1] Navigable Waters €=^36(1)
270k36(l) Most Cited Cases
Briefs and Other Related Documents
Supreme Court of the United States
State of MONTANA et al., Petitioners,
v.
UNITED STATES et al.
No. 79-1128.
Argued Dec. 3, 1980.
Decided March 24, 1981.
Rehearing Denied June 1, 1981.
See 452 U.S. 911, 101 S.Ct. 3042.
The United States in its own right and as fiduciary
on behalf of Crow Tribe of Indians sought to quiet
title to the bed and banks of the Big Horn River.
The United States District Court for the District of
Montana, 457 F.Supp. 599, declared that the state
of Montana owned the bed and banks of the Big
Horn River. The Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit,
reversed and remanded, 604 F.2d 1162. On writ of
certiorari, the Supreme Court, Justice Stewart, held
that: (1) title to the bed of the Big Horn River
passed to Montana upon its admission to the Union,
and (2) the Crow Indian Tribe had no power to
regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on
reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers of
the Tribe.
Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed, and case
remanded.
Justice Blackmun filed an opinion dissenting in
part, in which Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall
joined.
Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion.
West Headnotes
© 2005 Thomson/West. No

[1] Waters and Water Courses €=3?89
405k89 Most Cited Cases
Owners of land riparian to nonnavigable streams
may own adjacent riverbed, but conveyance by
United States of land riparian to navigable river
carries no interest in the riverbed, but, rather,
ownership of land under navigable waters is
incident of sovereignty.
[2] Navigable Waters €^>36(1)
270k36(l) Most Cited Cases
As general principle, ownership of land under
navigable waters is held in trust by federal
government for future states, to be granted to such
states when they enter Union and assume
sovereignty on equal footing with established states.
[3] Federal Courts €^>430
170Bk430 Most Cited Cases
[3] Navigable Waters €==>16
270k 16 Most Cited Cases
After state enters Union, title to land under
navigable waters therein is governed by state law,
subject to only one limitation, i. e., paramount
power of the United States to ensure that such
waters remain free for interstate and foreign
commerce.
[4] Navigable Waters €=>37(2)
270k37(2) Most Cited Cases
Congress may convey lands below high-water mark
of navigable water, and so defeat title of a new
state, in order to perform international obligations,
or to effect improvement of such lands for
promotion and convenience of commerce with
foreign nations and among several states, or to carry
out other public purposes appropriate to objects for
which the United States holds the
Territory. Treaty With the Crow Indians, Arts. I et
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493
(Cite as: 450 U.S. 544,101 S.Ct. 1245)
seq., II, 15 Stat. 649; Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11
Stat. 749.
[5] Navigable Waters C^>37(1)
270k37(l) Most Cited Cases
[5] Navigable Waters C=>37(7)
270k37(7) Most Cited Cases
Control over property underlying navigable waters
is so strongly identified with sovereign power of
government that it will not be held that United
States has conveyed such land except because of
some international duty or public exigency, and thus
court deciding question of title to bed of navigable
water must begin with strong presumption against
conveyance by the United States and must not infer
such unless the intention was definitely declared or
otherwise made plain or was rendered in clear and
special words or unless claim confirmed in terms
embraces land under waters of the stream.
[6] Indians €=^12
209k 12 Most Cited Cases
[6] Navigable Waters €==>37(7)
270k37(7) Most Cited Cases
Mere fact that bed of navigable water lies within
boundaries described in treaty does not make
riverbed part of conveyed land, especially when
there is no express reference to riverbed that might
overcome presumption against its conveyance.
Treaty With the Crow Indians, Arts. I et seq., II, 15
Stat. 649; Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stat. 749; Act
Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388; Act June 4,
1920, ch. 224, 41 Stat. 751; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1165;
33 U.S.C.A. § 10; 43 U.S.C.A. § 931.
[7] Indians €==>12
209k 12 Most Cited Cases
Whatever property rights were created by treaty
with Crow Tribe, there was failure to overcome
established presumption that beds of navigable
waters remained in trust for future states and passed
to new states when they assumed sovereignty.
Treaty With the Crow Indians, Arts. I et seq., II, IV,
15 Stat. 649; Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stat. 749;
Act Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388; Act June 4,
1920, ch. 224, 41 Stat. 751; 33 U.S.C.A. § 10; 43

U.S.C.A. §931.
[8] Navigable Waters €^36(1)
270k36(l) Most Cited Cases
Title to bed of Big Horn River passed to state of
Montana upon its admission into Union. Treaty
With the Crow Indians, Arts. I et seq., II, IV, 15
Stat. 649; Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stat 749;
Act Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388; Act June 4,
1920, ch. 224, 41 Stat. 751; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1165;
33 U.S.C.A. § 10; 43 U.S.C.A. § 931.
[9] Indians €=^32.6
209k32.6 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 209k32.5(l), 209k32)
Crow Tribe of Indians has power to prohibit
nonmembers from hunting or fishing on land
belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States
in trust for the Tribe, and if Tribe permits
nonmembers to fish or hunt on such lands, it may
condition their entry by charging fee or establishing
bag and creel limits. Treaty With the Crow Indians,
Arts. I et seq., II, 15 Stat 649; Act Feb. 8, 1887,
ch. 119, 24 Stat 388; Act June 4, 1920, ch. 224, 41
Stat 751.
[10] Indians €==>3(1)
209k3(l) Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 209k3)
Purposes of 1851 Treaty with Crow Tribe were to
assure safe passage for settlers across lands of
various Indian tribes, to compensate Tribes for loss
of buffalo, other game animals, timber and forage,
to delineate tribal boundaries, to promote intertribal
peace and to establish way of identifying Indians
who committed depredations against non-Indians.
Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stat. 749.
[11] Indians €=^12
209kl2 Most Cited Cases
The 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty with Crow Tribe
obligated United States to prohibit most
non-Indians from residing on or passing through
reservation lands used and occupied by the Tribe.
Treaty With the Crow Indians, Arts. II, IV, 15 Stat.
649;18U.S.C.A. § 1165.
[12] Indians €^13(1)
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101 S.Ct 1245
450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493
(Cite as: 450 U.S. 544,101 S.Ct. 1245)
209kl3(l) Most Cited Cases
Policy of Allotment Act was eventual assimilation
of Indian population and gradual extinction of
Indian reservations and Indian titles. Indian
General
Allotment Act, § 1 et seq., 25 U.S.C.A. § 331 et
seq.; Act June 4, 1920, ch. 224, 41 Stat. 751.
[13] Indians €=>32.6
209k32.6 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 209k32.5(l), 209k32)
Neither language of 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty nor
federal trespass statute provides support for tribal
authority to regulate hunting and fishing on land
owned by non-Indians. Treaty With the Crow
Indians, Arts. II, IV, 15 Stat. 649; 18 U.S.C.A. §§
1151,1165.
[14] Indians €^>32.6
209k32.6 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 209k32.5(l), 209k32)
Crow Indian Tribe does not have "inherent
sovereignty" so broad as to constitute source for
power on part of Tribe to regulate non-Indian
hunting and fishing on non-Indian lands within
reservation. Treaty With the Crow Indians, Arts. II,
IV, 15 Stat. 649; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1165.
[15] Indians €^>32(4.1)
209k32(4.1) Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 209k32(4), 209k32)
In addition to power to punish tribal offenders,
Indian tribes retain inherent power to determine
tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations
among members, and to prescribe rules of
inheritance for members, but exercise of tribal
power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal
self-government or to control internal relations is
inconsistent with dependent status of the tribes and
cannot survive without express congressional
delegation. Treaty With the Crow Indians, Arts. II,
IV, 15 Stat. 649; Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stat.
749; Indian General Allotment Act, § 1 et seq., 25
U.S.C.A. § 331 et seq.; Act June 4, 1920, ch. 224,
41 Stat. 751; Indian Reorganization Act, § 1 et
seq., 25 U.S.C.A. §461 etseq.
[16] Indians €^>32(8)
© 2005 Thomson/West. No

209k32(8) Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 209k32)
Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians on their reservations, even on
non-Indian fee lands, and tribe may regulate,
through taxation, licensing or other means, activities
of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships
with tribe or its members, through commercial
dealing, contracts, leases or other arrangements.
Treaty With the Crow Indians, Arts. II, IV, 15 Stat.
649; Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stat. 749; Indian
General Allotment Act, § 1 et seq., 25 U.S.C.A. §
331 et seq.; Act June 4, 1920, ch. 224, 41 Stat.
751; Indian Reorganization Act, § 1 et seq., 25
U.S.C.A. §461 etseq.
[17] Indians €==>32(8)
209k32(8) Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 209k32)
Indian tribe may retain inherent power to exercise
civil authority over conduct of non-Indians on fee
lands within its reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, economic security or health or welfare of
the tribe. Treaty With the Crow Indians, Arts. II,
IV, 15 Stat. 649; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1165.
**1247 Syllabus [FN*]
FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the
opinion of the Court but has been prepared
by the Reporter of Decisions for the
convenience of the reader. See United
States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S.
321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.
*544 By a tribal regulation, the Crow Tribe of
Montana sought to prohibit hunting and fishing
within its reservation by anyone who is not a
member of the Tribe. Relying on its purported
ownership of the bed of the Big Horn River, on
treaties which created its reservation, and on its
inherent power as a sovereign, the Tribe claimed
authority to prohibit hunting and fishing by
nonmembers of the Tribe even on lands within the
reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians.
Montana, however, continued to assert its authority
to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians
within the reservation. The First Treaty of Fort
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493
(Cite as: 450 U.S. 544,101 S.Ct. 1245)
Laramie of 1851, in which the signatory tribes
acknowledged various designated lands as their
respective territories, specified that, by making the
treaty, the tribes did not "surrender the privilege of
hunting, fishing, or passing over" any of the lands in
dispute. In 1868, the Second Treaty of Fort
Laramie established the Crow Reservation,
including land through which the Big Horn River
flows, and provided that the reservation "shall be ...
set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and
occupation" of the Tribe, and that no non-Indians
except Government agents "shall ever be permitted
to pass over, settle upon, or reside in" the
reservation. To resolve the conflict between the
Tribe and the State, the United States, proceeding in
its own right and as fiduciary for the Tribe,filedthe
present action, seeking a declaratory judgment
quieting title to **1248 the riverbed in the United
States as trustee for the Tribe and establishing that
the Tribe and the United States have sole authority
to regulate hunting and fishing within the
reservation, and an injunction requiring Montana to
secure the Tribe's permission before issuing hunting
or fishing licenses for use within the reservation.
The District Court denied relief, but the Court of
Appeals reversed. It held that the bed and banks of
the river were held by the United States in trust for
the Tribe; that the Tribe could regulate hunting and
fishing within the reservation by nonmembers,
except for hunting and fishing on fee lands by
resident nonmember owners of those lands; and
that nonmembers permitted by the Tribe to hunt or
fish within the reservation remained subject to
Montana's fish and game laws.
Held:
1. Title to the bed of the Big Horn River passed to
Montana upon *545 its admission into the
Union, the United States not having conveyed
beneficial ownership of the riverbed to the Crow
Tribe by the treaties of 1851 or 1868. As a general
principle, the Federal Government holds lands
under navigable waters in trust for future States, to
be granted to such States when they enter the
Union, and there is a strong presumption against
conveyance of such lands by the United States.
The 1851 treaty failed to overcome this
© 2005 Thomson/West. No
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presumption, since it did not by its terms formally
convey any land to the Indians at all. And whatever
property rights the 1868 treaty created, its language
is not strong enough to overcome the presumption
against the sovereign's conveyance of the riverbed.
Cf. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49,
46 S.Ct. 197, 70 L.Ed. 465. Moreover, the
situation of the Crow Indians at the time of the
treaties presented no "public exigency" which
would have required Congress to departfromits
policy of reserving ownership of beds under
navigable waters for the fiiture States. Pp.
1250-1254.
2. Although the Tribe may prohibit or regulate
hunting or fishing by nonmembers on land
belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States
in trust for the Tribe, it has no power to regulate
non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land
owned in fee by nonmembers of the Tribe. Pp.
1254-1259.
(a) The 1851 treaty nowhere suggested that
Congress intended to grant such power to the Tribe.
And while the 1868 treaty obligated the United
States to prohibit most non-Indians from residing on
or passing through reservation lands used and
occupied by the Tribe, thereby arguably conferring
upon the Tribe authority to control fishing and
hunting on those lands, that authority can only
extend to land on which the Tribe exercises
"absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" and
cannot apply to subsequently alienated lands held in
fee by non-Indians. Cf. Puyallup Tribe v.
Washington Game Dept., 433 U.S. 165, 97 S.Ct.
2616, 53 L.Ed.2d 667. Nor does the federal
trespass statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1165, which prohibits
trespassing to hunt or fish, "augment" the Tribe's
regulatory powers over non-Indian lands. That
statute is limited to lands owned by Indians, held in
trust by the United States for Indians, or reserved
for use by Indians, and Congress deliberately
excluded fee-patented lands from its scope. Pp.
1254-1257
(b) The Tribe's "inherent sovereignty" does not
support its regulation of non-Indian hunting and
fishing on non-Indian lands within the reservation.
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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(Cite as: 450 U.S. 544,101 S.Ct. 1245)
Through their original incorporation into the United
States, as well as through specific treaties and
statutes, the Indian tribes have lost many of the
attributes of sovereignty, particularly as to the
relations between a tribe and nonmembers of the
tribe. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 98
S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303. Exercise of tribal
power beyond what *546 is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal
relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of
the tribes, and so cannot survive without express
congressional delegation. Here, regulation of
hunting and fishing by nonmembers of the Tribe on
lands no longer owned by the Tribe bears no clear
relationship **1249 to tribal self-government or
internal relations. Non-Indian
hunters
and
fishermen on non-Indian fee land do not enter any
agreements or dealings with the Tribe so as to
subject themselves to tribal civil jurisdiction. And
nothing suggests that such non-Indian hunting and
fishing so threatened the Tribe's political or
economic security as to justify tribal regulation.
Pp. 1257-1259.
9 Cir., 604 F.2d 1162, reversed and remanded.
Urban L. Roth, Butte, Mont., for petitioners.
Louis F. Claiborne,
respondent U. S.

Washington,

D. C ,

for

Thomas J. Lynaugh, Billings,
respondent Crow Tribe of Indians.

Mont.,

for

*547 Justice STEWART delivered the opinion of
the Court.
This case concerns the sources and scope of the
power of an Indian tribe to regulate hunting and
fishing by non-Indians on lands within its
reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians.
Relying on its purported ownership of the bed of the
Big Horn River, on the treaties which created its
reservation and on its inherent power as a
sovereign, the Crow Tribe of Montana claims the
authority to prohibit all hunting and fishing by
nonmembers of the Tribe on non-Indian property
within reservation boundaries. We granted
© 2005 Thomson/West. No

certiorari, 445 U.S. 960, 100 S.Ct. 1645, 64
L.Ed.2d 234 to review a decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that
substantially upheld this claim.
I
The Crow Indians originated in Canada, but some
three centuries ago they migrated to what is now
southern Montana. In the 19th century, warfare
between the Crows and several other tribes led the
tribes and the United States to sign the First Treaty
of Fort Laramie of 1851, in which the *548
signatory tribes acknowledged various designated
lands as their respective territories. See 11 Stat.
749 and 2 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and
Treaties 594 (1904) (hereinafter Kappler). The
treaty identified approximately 38.5 million acres as
Crow territory and, in Article 5, specified that, by
making the treaty, the tribes did not "surrender the
privilege of hunting, fishing, or passing over" any of
the lands in dispute. In 1868, the Second Treaty of
Fort Laramie established a Crow Reservation of
roughly 8 million acres, including land through
which the Big Horn River flows. 15 Stat. 649. By
Article II of the treaty, the United States agreed that
the reservation "shall be ... set apart for the absolute
and undisturbed use and occupation" of the Crow
Tribe, and that no non-Indians except agents of the
Government "shall ever be permitted to pass over,
settle upon, or reside in" the reservation.
Several subsequent Acts of Congress reduced the
reservation to slightly fewer than 2.3 million acres.
See 22 Stat. 42 (1882); § 31, 26 Stat. 1039-1040
(1891); ch. 1624, 33 Stat. 352 (1904); ch. 890, 50
Stat. 884 (1937). In addition, the General
Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, and
the Crow Allotment Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 751,
authorized the issuance of patents in fee to
individual Indian allottees within the reservation.
Under these Acts, an allottee could alienate his land
to a non-Indian after holding it for 25 years.
Today, roughly 52 percent of the reservation is
allotted to members of the Tribe and held by the
United States in trust for them, 17 percent is held in
trust for the Tribe itself, and approximately 28
percent is held in fee by non-Indians. The State of
Montana owns in fee simple 2 percent of the
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493
(Cite as: 450 U.S. 544,101 S.Ct. 1245)
reservation, the United States less than 1 percent.
Since the 1920's, the State of Montana has stocked
the waters of the reservation with fish, and the
construction of a dam by the United States made
trout fishing in the Big Horn River possible. The
reservation also contains game, some of it stocked
by the State. Since the 1950's, the Crow Tribal
*549 Council has passed several resolutions
**1250 respecting hunting and fishing on the
reservation, including Resolution No. 74-05, the
occasion for this lawsuit. That resolution prohibits
hunting and fishing within the reservation by
anyone who is not a member of the Tribe. The
State of Montana, however, has continued to assert
its authority to regulate hunting and fishing by
non-Indians within the reservation.
On October 9, 1975, proceeding in its own right
and as fiduciary for the Tribe, the United States
endeavored to resolve the conflict between the
Tribe and the State by filing the present lawsuit.
The plaintiff sought (1) a declaratory judgment
quieting title to the bed of the Big Horn River in the
United States as trustee for the Tribe, (2) a
declaratory judgment establishing that the Tribe and
the United States have sole authority to regulate
hunting and fishing within the reservation, and (3)
an injunction requiring Montana to secure the
permission of the Tribe before issuing hunting or
fishing licenses for use within the reservation.
The District Court denied the relief sought. 457
F.Supp. 599. In determining the ownership of the
river, the court invoked the presumption that the
United States does not intend to divest itself of its
sovereign rights in navigable waters and reasoned
that here, as in United States v. Holt State Bank,
270 U.S. 49, 46 S.Ct. 197, 70 L.Ed. 465, the
language and circumstances of the relevant treaties
were insufficient to rebut the presumption. The
court thus concluded that the bed and banks of the
river had remained in the ownership of the United
States until they passed to Montana on its admission
to the Union. As to the dispute over the regulation
of hunting and fishing the court found that
"[i]mplicit in the Supreme Court's decision in
Oliphant [v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,
© 2005 Thomson/West. No

98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209] is the recognition
that Indian tribes do not have the power, nor do
they have the authority to regulate non-Indians
unless so granted by an act of Congress." 457
F.Supp., at 609. Because no treaty or Act of
Congress gave the Tribe authority to regulate
hunting or fishing by non-Indians, the court held
*550 that the Tribe could not exercise such
authority except by granting or withholding
authority to trespass on tribal or Indian land. All
other authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and
fishing resided concurrently in the State of Montana
and, under 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (which makes it a
federal offense to trespass on Indian land to hunt or
fish without permission), the United States.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the
District Court. 604 F.2d 1162. Relying on its
opinion in United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 822,
vacated on other grounds, 433 U.S. 676, 97 S.Ct.
2909, 53 L.Ed.2d 1048, the appellate court held
that, pursuant to the treaty of 1868, the bed and
banks of the river were held by the United States in
trust for the Tribe. Relying on the treaties of 1851
and 1868, the court held that the Tribe could
regulate hunting and fishing within the reservation
by nonmembers, although the court noted that the
Tribe could not impose criminal sanctions on those
nonmembers. The court also held, however, that the
two Allotment Acts implicitly deprived the Tribe of
the authority to prohibit hunting and fishing on fee
lands by resident non-member owners of those
lands. Finally, the court held that non-members
permitted by the Tribe to hunt or fish within the
reservation remained subject to Montana's fish and
game laws.

n
The respondents seek to establish a substantial part
of their claim of power to control hunting and
fishing on the reservation by asking us to recognize
their title to the bed of the Big Horn River. [FN1]
The question** 1251 is whether the United States
*551 conveyed beneficial ownership of the
riverbed to the Crow Tribe by the treaties of 1851
or 1868, and therefore continues to hold the land in
trust for the use and benefit of the Tribe, or whether
the United States retained ownership of the riverbed
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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as public land which then passed to the State of
Montana upon its admission to the Union. Choctaw
Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 627-628, 90
S.Ct. 1328, 1332-1333, 25 L.Ed.2d 615.
FN1. According to the respondents, the
Crow Tribe's interest in restricting hunting
and fishing on the reservation focuses
almost entirely on sports fishing and duck
hunting in the waters and on the surface of
the Big Horn River. The parties, the
District Court, and the Court of Appeals
have all assumed that ownership of the
riverbed will largely determine the power
to control these activities. Moreover,
although the complaint in this case sought
to quiet title only to the bed of the Big
Horn River, we note the concession of the
United States that if the bed of the river
passed to Montana upon its admission to
the Union, the State at the same time
acquired ownership of the banks of the
river as well.
[1][2][3][4][5] Though the owners of land riparian
to nonnavigable streams may own the adjacent
riverbed, conveyance by the United States of land
riparian to a navigable river carries no interest in
the riverbed. Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 672, 11
S.Ct. 210, 212, 34 L.Ed. 819; Railroad Co. v.
Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272, 289, 19 L.Ed. 74; 33
U.S.C. § 10; 43 U.S.C. § 931. Rather, the
ownership of land under navigable waters is an
incident of sovereignty. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet.
367, 409-411, 10 L.Ed. 997. As a general
principle, the Federal Government holds such lands
in trust for future States, to be granted to such States
when they enter the Union and assume sovereignty
on an "equal footing" with the established States.
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 222-223,
229, 11 L.Ed. 565. After a State enters the Union,
title to the land is governed by state law. The
State's power over the beds of navigable waters
remains subject to only one limitation: the
paramount power of the United States to ensure that
such waters remain free to interstate and foreign
commerce. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14,
55 S.Ct. 610, 615, 79 L.Ed. 1267. It is now
© 2005 Thomson/West. No

established, however, that Congress may sometimes
convey lands below the high-water mark of a
navigable water,
"[and so defeat the title of a new State,] in order
to perform international obligations, or to effect
the improvement of such lands for the promotion
and convenience of commerce with foreign
nations and among the several States, or to carry
out other public purposes appropriate to the
objects for which the United States hold the
Territory." Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48, 14
S.Ct. 548, 566, 38 L.Ed. 331.
*552 But because control over the property
underlying navigable waters is so strongly identified
with the sovereign power of government, United
States v. Oregon, supra, at 14, 55 S.Ct., at 615, it
will not be held that the United States has conveyed
such land except because of "some international
duty or public exigency." United States v. Holt
State Bank, 270 U.S., at 55, 46 S.Ct., at 199. See
also Shively v. Bowlby, supra, at 48, 14 S.Ct., at
566. A court deciding a question of title to the bed
of a navigable water must, therefore, begin with a
strong presumption against conveyance by the
United States, United States v. Oregon, supra, at
14, 55 S.Ct, at 615, and must not infer such a
conveyance "unless the intention was definitely
declared or otherwise made plain," United States v.
Holt State Bank, supra, 270 U.S., at 55, 46 S.Ct, at
199, or was rendered "in clear and especial words,"
Martin v. Waddell, supra, at 411, or "unless the
claim confirmed in terms embraces the land under
the waters of the stream," Packer v. Bird, supra, at
672,11 S.Ct, at 212. [FN2]
FN2. Congress was, of course, aware of
this presumption once it was established by
this Court. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v.
Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 588, 97 S.Ct. 1361,
1363, 51L.Ed.2d660.
In United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, this
Court applied these principles to reject an Indian
Tribe's claim of title to the bed of a navigable lake.
The lake lay wholly within the boundaries of the
Red Lake Indian Reservation, which had been
created by treaties entered into before Minnesota
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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joined the Union. In these treaties the United
States promised to "set apart and withhold from
sale, for the use o f the **1252 Chippewas, a large
tract of land, Treaty of Sept. 30, 1854, 10 Stat.
1109, and to convey "a sufficient quantity of land
for the permanent homes" of the Indians, Treaty of
Feb. 22, 1855, 10 Stat. 1165. See Minnesota v.
Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 389, 22 S.Ct. 650, 656,
46 L.Ed. 954. [FN3] The Court concluded that
there was nothing in the treaties "which even
approaches a grant of rights in lands underlying
navigable waters; nor anything evincing a purpose
*553 to depart from the established policy ... of
treating such lands as held for the benefit of the
future State." United States v. Holt State Bank, 270
U.S., at 58-59, 46 S.Ct, at 200. Rather, "[t]he
effect of what was done was to reserve in a general
way for the continued occupation of the Indians
what remained of their aboriginal territory." Id, at
58, 46 S.Ct, at 200.
FN3. The Hitchcock decision expressly
stated that the Red Lake Reservation was
"a reservation within the accepted meaning
of the term." 185 U.S., at 389, 22 S.Ct, at
656.
[6] [7] The Crow treaties in this case, like the
Chippewa treaties in Holt State Bank, fail to
overcome the established presumption that the beds
of navigable waters remain in trust for future States
and pass to the new States when they assume
sovereignty. The 1851 treaty did not by its terms
formally convey any land to the Indians at all, but
instead chiefly represented a covenant among
several tribes which recognized specific boundaries
for their respective territories. Treaty of Fort
Laramie, 1851, Art. 5, 2 Kappler 594- 595. It
referred to hunting and fishing only insofar as it
said that the Crow Indians "do not surrender the
privilege of hunting, fishing, or passing over any of
the tracts of country heretofore described," a
statement that had no bearing on ownership of the
riverbed. By contrast, the 1868 treaty did
expressly convey land to the Crow Tribe. Article II
of the treaty described the reservation land in detail
[FN4] and stated that such land would be "set apart
for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation
© 2005 Thomson/West. No

of the Indians herein named...." Second Treaty of
Fort Laramie, May 7, 1868, Art. II, 15 Stat 650.
The treaty then stated:
FN4. "[C]ommencing where the 107th
degree of longitude west of Greenwich
crosses the south boundary of Montana
Territory; thence north along said 107th
meridian to the mid-channel of the
Yellowstone River; thence up said
mid-channel of the Yellowstone to the
point where it crosses the said southern
boundary of Montana, being the 45th
degree of north latitude; and thence east
along said parallel of latitude to the place
of beginning...." Second Treaty of Fort
Laramie, May 7, 1868, Art. II, 15 Stat.
650.
"[T]he United States now solemnly agrees that no
persons, except those herein designated and
authorized to *554 do so, and except such
officers, agents, and employes of the Government
as may be authorized to enter upon Indian
reservations in discharge of duties enjoined by
law, shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle
upon, or reside in the territory described in this
article for the use of said Indians...." Ibid
Whatever property rights the language of the 1868
treaty created, however, its language is not strong
enough to overcome the presumption against the
sovereign's conveyance of the riverbed. The treaty
in no way expressly referred to the riverbed, Packer
v. Bird, 137 U.S., at 672, 11 S.Ct, at 212, nor was
an intention to convey the riverbed expressed in
"clear and especial words," Martin v. Waddell, 16
Pet, at 411, or "definitely declared or otherwise
made very plain," United States v. Holt State Bank,
270 U.S., at 55, 46 S.Ct, at 199. Rather, as in Holt
, "[t]he effect of what was done was to reserve in a
general way for the continued occupation of the
Indians what remained of their aboriginal territory."
Id., at 58, 46 S.Ct, at 200.
Though Article 2 gave the Crow Indians the sole
right to use and occupy the reserved land, and,
implicitly, the power to exclude others from it, the
respondents' reliance on that provision simply begs
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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the question of the precise extent of the conveyed
lands to which this exclusivity attaches. The mere
fact that the bed of a **1253 navigable water lies
within the boundaries described in the treaty does
not make the riverbed part of the conveyed land,
especially when there is no express reference to the
riverbed that might overcome the presumption
against its conveyance. In the Court of Appeals'
Finch decision, on which recognition of the Crow
Tribe's title to the riverbed rested in this case, that
court construed the language of exclusivity in the
1868 treaty as granting to the Indians all the lands,
including the riverbed, within the described
boundaries. United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d, at
829. Such a construction, however, cannot survive
examination. *555 As the Court of Appeals
recognized, ibid., and as the respondents concede,
the United States retains a navigational easement in
the navigable waters lying within the described
boundaries for the benefit of the public, regardless
of who owns the riverbed. Therefore, such phrases
in the 1868 treaty as "absolute and undisturbed use
and occupation" and "no persons, except those
herein designated ... shall ever be permitted,"
whatever they seem to mean literally, do not give
the Indians the exclusive right to occupy all the
territory within the described boundaries. Thus,
even if exclusivity were the same as ownership, the
treaty language establishing this "right of
exclusivity" could not have the meaning that the
Court of Appeals ascribed to it. [FN5]
FN5. In one recent case, Choctaw Nation
v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 90 S.Ct. 1328,
25 L.Ed.2d 615, this Court did construe a
reservation grant as including the bed of a
navigable water, and the respondents argue
that this case resembles Choctaw Nation
more than it resembles the established line
of cases to which Choctaw Nation is a
singular exception. But the finding of a
conveyance of the riverbed in Choctaw
Nation was based on very peculiar
circumstances not present in this case.
Those circumstances arose from the
unusual history of the treaties there at
issue, a history which formed an important
basis of the decision. Id. at 622-628, 90
© 2005 Thomson/West. No
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S.Ct, at 1330-1333. Immediately after
the Revolutionary War, the United States
had signed treaties of peace and protection
with the Cherokee and Choctaw Tribes,
reserving them lands in Georgia and
Mississippi. In succeeding years the
United States bought large areas of land
from the Indians to make room for white
settlers who were encroaching on tribal
lands, but the Government signed new
treaties guaranteeing that the Indians could
live in peace on those lands not ceded.
The United States soon betrayed that
promise. It proposed that the Tribes be
relocated in a newly acquired part of the
Arkansas Territory, but the new territory
was soon overrun by white settlers, and
through a series of new cession agreements
the Indians were forced to relocate farther
and farther west. Ultimately, most of the
Tribes' members refused to leave their
eastern lands, doubting the reliability of
the Government's promises of the new
western land, but Georgia and Mississippi,
anxious for the relocation westward so
they could assert jurisdiction over the
Indian lands, purported to abolish the
Tribes and distribute the tribal lands. The
Choctaws and Cherokees finally signed
new treaties with the United States aimed
at rectifying their past suffering at the
hands of the Federal Government and the
States.
Under the Choctaw treaty, the United
States promised to convey new lands west
of the Arkansas Territory in fee simple,
and also pledged that "no Territory or
State shall ever have a right to pass laws
for the government of the Choctaw Nation
... and that no part of the land granted to
them shall ever be embraced in any
Territory or State." Treaty of Dancing
Rabbit Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat.
333-334, quoted in Choctaw Nation v.
Oklahoma, 397 U.S., at 625, 90 S.Ct., at
1331. In 1835, the Cherokees signed a
treaty
containing
similar
provisions
granting reservation lands in fee simple
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

VXTAO+^A-

A

nncro™™

101 S.Ct. 1245

Page 10

450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493
(Cite as: 450 U.S. 544,101 S.Ct. 1245)
and promising that the tribal lands would
not become part of any State or Territory.
Id, at 626, 90 S.Ct, at 1332. In
concluding that the United States had
intended to convey the riverbed to the
Tribes before the admission of Oklahoma
to the Union, the Choctaw Court relied on
these
circumstances
surrounding
the
treaties and placed special emphasis on the
Government's promise that the reserved
lands would never become part of any
State. Id, at 634-635, 90 S.Ct, at 1336.
Neither the special historical origins of the
Choctaw and Cherokee treaties nor the
crucial provisions granting Indian lands in
fee simple and promising freedom from
state jurisdiction in those treaties have any
counterparts
in
the
terms
and
circumstances of the Crow treaties of 1851
and 1868.
*556 Moreover, even though the establishment of
an Indian reservation can be an "appropriate public
purpose" within the meaning of Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S., at 48, 14 S.Ct, at 566, justifying a
congressional conveyance of a riverbed, see, e. g.,
Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S.
78, 85, 39 S.Ct. 40, 63 L.Ed. 138, the situation of
the Crow Indians at the time of the **1254 treaties
presented no "public exigency" which would have
required Congress to depart from its policy of
reserving ownership of beds under navigable waters
for the future States. See Shively v. Bowlby, supra,
at 48, 14 S.Ct, at 566. As the record in this case
shows, at the time of the treaty the Crows were a
nomadic tribe dependent chiefly on buffalo, and
fishing was not important to their diet or way of life.
1 App. 74. Cf, Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United
States, supra, at 88, 39 S.Ct, at 41; Skokomish
Indian Tribe v. France, 320 F.2d 205, 212 (CA9).
[8] For these reasons, we conclude that title to the
bed of the Big Horn River passed to the State of
Montana upon its *557 admission into the Union,
and that the Court of Appeals was in error in
holding otherwise.
Ill
© 2005 Thomson/West. No

[9] Though the parties in this case have raised
broad questions about the power of the Tribe to
regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on the
reservation, the regulatory issue before us is a
narrow one. The Court of Appeals held that the
Tribe may prohibit nonmembers from hunting or
fishing on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the
United States in trust for the Tribe, 604 F.2d, at
1165-1166, and with this holding we can readily
agree. We also agree with the Court of Appeals
that if the Tribe permits nonmembers to fish or hunt
on such lands, it may condition their entry by
charging a fee or establishing bag and creel limits.
Ibid. What remains is the question of the power of
the Tribe to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting
on reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers of
the Tribe. The Court of Appeals held that, with
respect to fee-patented lands, the Tribe may
regulate, but may not prohibit, hunting and fishing
by non-member resident owners or by those, such as
tenants or employees, whose occupancy is
authorized by the owners. Id, at 1169. The court
further held that the Tribe may totally prohibit
hunting and fishing on lands within the reservation
owned by non-Indians who do not occupy that land.
Ibid
The Court of Appeals found two sources for this
tribal regulatory power: the Crow treaties,
"augmented" by 18 U.S.C. § 1165, and "inherent"
Indian sovereignty. We believe that neither source
supports the court's conclusion.
A
[10] The purposes of the 1851 treaty were to assure
safe passage for settlers across the lands of various
Indian Tribes; to compensate the Tribes for the loss
of buffalo, other game animals, timber, and forage;
to delineate tribal boundaries; to promote
intertribal peace; and to establish a way of iden
tifying *558 Indians who committed depredations
against non-Indians. As noted earlier, the treaty did
not even create a reservation, although it did
designate tribal lands. See Crow Tribe v. United
States, 284 F.2d 361, 364, 366, 368, 151 Ct.Cl.
281, 285-286, 289, 292-293. Only Article 5 of that
Treaty referred to hunting and fishing, and it merely
provided that the eight signatory tribes "do not
L to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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surrender the privilege of hunting, fishing, or
passing over any of the tracts of country heretofore
described." 2 Kappler 595. [FN6] The treaty
nowhere suggested that Congress intended to grant
authority to the Crow Tribe to regulate hunting and
fishing by nonmembers on nonmember lands.
Indeed, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that
after the treaty was signed non-Indians, as well as
members of other Indian tribes, undoubtedly hunted
and fished within the treaty-designated territory of
the Crows. 604 F.2d, at 1167.
FN6. The complaint in this case did not
allege that non-Indian hunting and fishing
on reservation lands has impaired this
privilege.
[11][12] The 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, 15 Stat.
649, reduced the size of the Crow territory
designated by the 1851 treaty. **1255 Article II of
the treaty established a reservation for the Crow
Tribe, and provided that it be "set apart for the
absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the
Indians herein named, and for such other friendly
tribes or individual Indians as from time to time
they may be willing, with the consent of the United
States, to admit amongst them ...," (emphasis
added) and that "the United States now solemnly
agrees that no persons, except those herein
designated and authorized so to do ... shall ever be
permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in the
territory described in this article for the use of said
Indians...." The treaty, therefore, obligated the
United States to prohibit most non-Indians from
residing on or passing through reservation lands
used and occupied by the Tribe, and, thereby,
arguably conferred upon the Tribe *559 the
authority to control fishing and hunting on those
lands. [FN7] But that authority could only extend
to land on which the Tribe exercises "absolute and
undisturbed use and occupation." And it is clear
that the quantity of such land was substantially
reduced by the allotment and alienation of tribal
lands as a result of the passage of the General
Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, as amended,
25 U.S.C. § 331 et seq., and the Crow Allotment
Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 751. [FN8] If the 1868 treaty
created tribal power to restrict or prohibit

non-Indian hunting and fishing on the reservation,
that power cannot apply to lands held in fee by
non-Indians. [FN9]
FN7. Article IV of the treaty addressed
hunting rights specifically. But that
Article referred only to "unoccupied lands
of the United States," viz., lands outside
the reservation
boundaries, and is
accordingly not relevant here.
FN8. The 1920 Crow Allotment Act was
one of the special Allotment Acts Congress
passed from time to time pursuant to the
policy underlying the General Allotment
Act. See S.Rep.No.219, 66th Cong., 1st
Sess., 5 (1919). The Senate Committee
Report on the Crow Allotment bill stated
that it "is in accordance with the policy to
which Congress gave its adherence many
years ago, and which found expression in
the [General Allotment Act]." Ibid.
FN9. The Court of Appeals discussed the
effect of the Allotment Acts as follows:
"While neither of these Acts, nor any other
to which our attention has been called,
explicitly qualifies the Tribe's rights over
hunting and fishing, it defies reason to
suppose that Congress intended that
non-members who reside on fee patent
lands could hunt and fish thereon only by
consent of the Tribe. So far as the record
of this case reveals, no efforts to exclude
completely non-members of the Crow
Tribe from hunting and fishing within the
reservation were being made by the Crow
Tribe at the time of enactment of the
Allotment Acts." 604 F.2d 1162, 1168
(footnote omitted).
But nothing in the Allotment Acts supports
the view of the Court of Appeals that the
Tribe could nevertheless bar hunting and
fishing by non-resident fee owners. The
policy of the Acts was the eventual
assimilation of the Indian population.
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369
U.S. 60, 72, 82 S.Ct. 562, 569, 7 L.Ed.2d
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573, and the "gradual extinction of Indian
reservations and Indian titles." Draper v.
United States, 164 U.S. 240, 246, 17 S.Ct.
107, 109, 41 L.Ed. 419. The Secretary of
the Interior and the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs repeatedly emphasized that
the allotment policy was designed to
eventually eliminate tribal relations. See,
e. g., Secretary of the Interior Ann.Rep.,
vol. 1, pp. 25-28 (1885); Secretary of the
Interior Ann.Rep., vol 1, p. 4 (1886);
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Ann.Rep.,
vol. 1, pp. IV-X (1887); Secretary of the
Interior
Ann.Rep.,
vol.
1,
pp.
XXIX-XXXII (1888); Commissioner of
Indian Affairs Ann.Rep. 3-4 (1889);
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Ann.Rep.
VI, XXXIX (1890); Commissioner of
Indian Affairs Ann.Rep., vol. 1, pp. 3-9, 26
(1891); Commissioner of Indian Affairs
Ann.Rep. 5 (1892); Secretary of the
Interior Ann.Rep., vol. 1, p. IV (1894).
And throughout the congressional debates
on the subject of allotment, it was assumed
that the "civilization" of the Indian
population was to be accomplished, in
part, by the dissolution of tribal relations.
See, e. g, 11 Cong.Rec. 779 (Sen. Vest),
782 (Sen. Coke), 783-784 (Sen. Saunders),
875 (Sens. Morgan and Hoar), 881 (Sen.
Brown), 905 (Sen. Butler), 939 (Sen.
Teller), 1003 (Sen. Morgan), 1028 (Sen.
Hoar), 1064, 1065 (Sen. Plumb), 1067
(Sen. Williams) (1881).
There is simply no suggestion in the
legislative history that Congress intended
that the non-Indians who would settle upon
alienated allotted lands would be subject to
tribal
regulatory
authority.
Indeed,
throughout the congressional debates,
allotment of Indian land was consistently
equated with the dissolution of tribal
affairs and jurisdiction. See, e. g, id, at
Cong.Rec. 785 (Sen. Morgan), 875 (Sen.
Hoar), 876 (Sen. Morgan), 878 (Sens.
Hoar and Coke), 881 (Sen. Brown), 908
(Sen. Call), 939 (Sen. Teller), 1028 (Sen.
Hoar),
1067 (Sens. Edmunds
and

Williams). It defies common sense to
suppose that Congress would intend that
non-Indians purchasing allotted lands
would become subject to tribal jurisdiction
when an avowed purpose of the allotment
policy was the ultimate destruction of
tribal government. And it is hardly likely
that Congress could have imagined that the
purpose of peaceful assimilation could be
advanced if fee-holders could be excluded
from fishing or hunting on their acquired
property.
The policy of allotment and sale of surplus
reservation land was, of course, repudiated
in 1934 by the Indian Reorganization Act,
48 Stat. 984, at 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq.
But what is relevant in this case is the
effect of the land alienation occasioned by
that policy on Indian treaty rights tied to
Indian use and occupation of reservation
land.
**1256 [13] *560 In Puyallup Tribe v.
Washington Game Dept, 433 U.S. 165, 97 S.Ct.
2616, 53 L.Ed.2d 667 (Puyallup III ), the relevant
treaty included language virtually identical to that in
the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie. The Puyallup
Reservation was to be "set apart, and, so far *561 as
necessary, surveyed and marked out for their
exclusive use ... [and no] white man [was to] be
permitted to reside upon the same without
permission of the tribe...." See/a?., at 174, 97 S.Ct,
at 2622. The Puyallup Tribe argued that those
words amounted to a grant of authority to fish free
of state interference. But this Court rejected that
argument, finding, in part, that it "clashe[d] with the
subsequent history of the reservation ...," ibid,
notably two Acts of Congress under which the
Puyallups alienated, in fee simple, the great
majority of the lands in the reservation, including
all the land abutting the Puyallup River. Thus,
"[n]either the Tribe nor its members continue to
hold Puyallup River fishing grounds for their
'exclusive use.' " Ibid. Puyallup III indicates,
therefore, that treaty rights with respect to
reservation lands must be read in light of the
subsequent alienation of those lands. Accordingly,
the language of the 1868 treaty provides no support
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for tribal authority to regulate hunting and fishing
on land owned by non-Indians.
The Court of Appeals also held that the federal
trespass statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1165, somehow
"augmented" the Tribe's regulatory powers over
non-Indian land. 604 F.2d, at 1167. If anything,
however, that statute suggests the absence of such
authority, since Congress deliberately excluded
fee-patented lands from the statute's scope. The
statute provides:
"Whoever,
without
lawful
authority
or
permission, willfully and knowingly goes upon
any land that belongs to any Indian or Indian
tribe, band, or group and either are held by the
United States in trust or are subject to a
restriction against alienation imposed by the
United States, or upon any lands of the United
States that are reserved for Indian use, for the
purpose of hunting, trapping, or fishing thereon,
or for the removal of game, peltries, or fish
therefrom, shall be fined ...."
The statute is thus limited to lands owned
by Indians, held in trust by the United
States for Indians, or reserved for use *562
by Indians. [FN 10] If Congress had
wished to extend tribal jurisdiction to lands
owned by non-Indians, it could easily have
done so by incorporating in § 1165 the
definition of "Indian country" in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151: "all land within the limits of any
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of
the
United
States
Government,
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent,
and including rights-of-way
running
through the reservation." Indeed, a
Subcommittee of the House Committee on
the Judiciary proposed that this be done.
But the Department of the Interior
recommended against doing so in a letter
dated May 23, 1958. The Department
pointed out that a previous congressional
Report, H.R.Rep.No.2593, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1958), [FN11] had made clear that
the bill **1257 contained no implication
that it would apply to land other than that
held or controlled by Indians or the United
States. [FN 12] *563 The Committee on

the Judiciary then adopted the present
language,
which
does
not
reach
fee-patented lands within the boundaries of
an Indian reservation.
FN 10. See United States v. Bouchard, 464 F.Supp.
1316, 1336 (W D Wis.); United States v. Pollmann
, 364 F.Supp. 995 (D C Mont.).
FN11. House Report No.2593 stated that
the purpose of the bill that became 18
U.S.C. § 1165 was to make it unlawful to
enter Indian land to hunt, trap, or fish
without the consent of the individual
Indian or tribe:
"Indian property owners should have the
same protection as other property owners,
for example, a private hunting club may
keep nonmembers off its game lands or it
may issue a permit for a fee. One who
comes on such lands without permission
may be prosecuted under State law but a
non-Indian trespasser on an Indian
reservation enjoys immunity.

"Non-Indians are not subject to the
jurisdiction of Indian courts and cannot be
tried in Indian courts on trespass charges.
Further, there are no Federal laws which
can be invoked against trespassers."
H.R.Rep.No.2593, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., at
2.
FN 12. Subsequent Reports in the House
and Senate, H.R.Rep.No.625, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1959); S.Rep.No.1686, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), also refer to
"Indian lands" and "Indian property
owners" rather than "Indian country." In
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209,
this Court referred to S.Rep.No.1686,
which stated that "the legislation [18
U.S.C. § 1165] will give to the Indian
tribes and to individual Indian owners
certain rights that now exist as to others,
and fills a gap in the present law for the
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protection of their property'' 435 U.S., at
206, 98 S.Ct, at 1019. (Emphasis added.)
Before the Court of Appeals decision,
several other courts interpreted § 1165 to
be confined to lands owned by Indians, or
held in trust for their benefit. State v.
Baker, 464 F.Supp. 1377 (W D Wis.);
United States v. Bouchard, 464 F.Supp.
1316 (W D Wis.); United States v.
Pollmann, supra; Donahue v. California
Justice Court, 15 Cal.App.3d 557, 93
Cal.Rptr. 310. Cf. United States v.
Sanford, 547 F.2d 1085, 1089(CA9)
(holding that § 1165 was designed to
prevent encroachments on Indian lands,
rejecting the argument that § 1 165 makes
illegal the unauthorized killing of wildlife
on an Indian reservation, and noting that
"the application of Montana game laws to
the activities of non-Indians on Indian
reservations does not interfere with tribal
self-government on reservations).
B
[14] Beyond relying on the Crow treaties and 18
U.S.C. § 1 165 as source for the Tribe's power to
regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on
non-Indian lands within the reservation, the Court
of Appeals also identified that power as an incident
of the inherent sovereignty of the Tribe over the
entire Crow Reservation. 604 F.2d, at 1170. But
"inherent sovereignty" is not so broad as to support
the application of Resolution No. 74-05 to
non-Indian lands.
This Court most recently reviewed the principles of
inherent sovereignty in United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303. In
that case, noting that Indian tribes are "unique
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty
over both their members and their territory," id, at
323, 98 S.Ct., at 1086, the Court upheld the power
of a tribe to punish tribal members who violate
tribal criminal laws. But the Court was careful to
note that, through their original incorporation into
the United States as well as through specific treaties
and statutes, the Indian tribes have lost many of the
attributes of sovereignty. *564Id, at 326, 98
© 2005 Thomson/West. No
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S.Ct., at 1087. The Court distinguished between
those inherent powers retained by the tribes and
those divested:
"The areas in which such implicit divestiture of
sovereignty has been held to have occurred are
those involving the relations between an Indian
tribe and nonmembers of the tribe ....
These limitations rest on the fact that the
dependent status of Indian tribes within our
territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent
with their freedom independently to determine
their external relations. But the powers of
self-government, including the power to prescribe
and enforce internal criminal laws, are of a
different type. They involve only the relations
among members of a tribe. Thus, they are not
such powers as would necessarily be lost by
virtue of a tribe's dependent status." Ibid.
(Emphasis added.)
[15] Thus, in addition to the power to punish tribal
offenders, the Indian tribes retain their inherent
power to determine tribal membership, to regulate
domestic relations among members, and to
prescribe rules of inheritance for members. **1258
Id., at 322, n. 18, 98 S.Ct., at 1085, n. 18. But
exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to
protect tribal self-government or to control internal
relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of
the tribes, and so cannot survive without express
congressional delegation. Mescalero Apache Tribe
v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 1270,
36 L.Ed.2d 114; Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,
219-220, 79 S.Ct. 269, 270, 3 L.Ed.2d 251; United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381- 382, 6 S.Ct.
1109, 1112-1113, 30 L.Ed. 228; see McClanahan
v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171,
93 S.Ct. 1257, 1261, 36 L.Ed.2d 129. Since
regulation of hunting and fishing by nonmembers of
a tribe on lands no longer owned by the tribe bears
no clear relationship to tribal self-government or
internal relations, [FN 13] *565 the general
principles of retained inherent sovereignty did not
authorize the Crow Tribe to adopt Resolution No.
74-05.
FN13. Any argument that Resolution No.
74-05 is necessary to Crow tribal
i to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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self-government is refuted by the findings
of the District Court that the State of
Montana has traditionally exercised "near
exclusive" jurisdiction over hunting and
fishing on fee lands within the reservation,
and that the parties to this case had
accommodated themselves to the state
regulation. 457 F.Supp. 599, 610. The
Court of Appeals left these findings
unaltered and indeed implicitly reaffirmed
them, adding that the record reveals no
attempts by the Tribe at the time of the
Crow Allotment Act to forbid non-Indian
hunting and fishing on reservation lands.
604 F.2d, at 1168, and n. 11 A.
[16] [17] The Court recently applied these general
principles in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209,
rejecting a tribal claim of inherent sovereign
authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. Stressing that Indian tribes cannot
exercise power inconsistent with their diminished
status as sovereigns, the Court quoted Justice
Johnson's words in his concurrence in Fletcher v.
Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 147, 3 L.Ed. 162-the first
Indian case to reach this Court— that the Indian
tribes have lost any "right of governing every
person within their limits except themselves." 435
U.S., at 209, 98 S.Ct, at 1021. Though Oliphant
only determined inherent tribal authority in criminal
matters, [FN14] the principles on which it relied
support the general proposition that the inherent
sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to
the activities of nonmembers of the tribe. To be
sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power
to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians on their reservations, even on
non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate,
through taxation, licensing, or other means, the
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements. Williams v. Lee, supra, at 223, 79
S.Ct., at 272; Morris v. Hitchcock, *566194 U.S.
384, 24 S.Ct. 712, 48 L.Ed. 1030; Buster v. Wright,
135 F. 947, 950 (CA8); see Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation,

447 U.S. 134, 152-154, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 2080-2082,
65 L.Ed.2d 10. A tribe may also retain inherent
power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of
non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on
the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe. See Fisher v.
District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386, 96 S.Ct. 943,
946, 47 L.Ed.2d 106; Williams v. Lee, supra, at
220, 79 S.Ct., at 270; Montana Catholic Missions
v. Missoula County, 200 U.S. 118, 128-129, 26
S.Ct. 197, 200-201, 50 L.Ed. 398; Thomas v. Gay,
169 U.S. 264, 273, 18 S.Ct. 340, 343, 42 L.Ed. 740.
[FN15]
FN 14. By denying the Suquamish Tribe
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,
however, the Oliphant case would
seriously restrict the ability of a tribe to
enforce any purported regulation of
non-Indian
hunters
and
fishermen.
Moreover, a tribe would not be able to rely
for enforcement on the federal criminal
trespass statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1165, since
that statute does not apply to fee patented
lands. See supra, at 1256-1257, and nn.
10-12.
FN15. As a corollary, this Court has held
that Indian tribes retain rights to river
waters necessary to make their reservations
livable. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546, 599, 83 S.Ct. 1468, 1497, 10 L.Ed.2d
542.
**1259 No such circumstances, however, are
involved in this case. Non-Indian hunters and
fishermen on non-Indian fee land do not enter any
agreements or dealings with the Crow Tribe so as to
subject themselves to tribal civil jurisdiction. And
nothing in this case suggests that such non-Indian
hunting and fishing so threaten the Tribe's political
or economic security as to justify tribal regulation.
The complaint in the District Court did not allege
that non-Indian hunting and fishing on fee lands
imperil the subsistence or welfare of the Tribe.
[FN 16] Furthermore, the District Court made
express findings, left unaltered by the Court of
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Appeals, that the Crow Tribe has traditionally
accommodated itself to the State's "near exclusive"
regulation of hunting and fishing on fee lands within
the reservation. 457 F.Supp., at 609-610. And the
District Court found that Montana's statutory and
regulatory scheme does not prevent the Crow Tribe
from limiting *567 or forbidding non-Indian
hunting and fishing on lands still owned by or held
in trust for the Tribe or its members. Id, at 609.
FN 16. Similarly, the complaint did not
allege that the State has abdicated or
abused its responsibility for protecting and
managing wildlife, has established its
season, bag, or creel limits in such a way
as to impair the Crow Indians' treaty rights
to fish or hunt, or has imposed less
stringent hunting and fishing regulations
within the reservation than in other parts of
the State. Cf. United States v. Washington
, 384 F.Supp. 312, 410-411 (W D Wash.),
aff d, 520 F.2d 676 (CA9).
IV
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment
of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded to that court for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
*569 Justice BLACKMUN, with whom Justice
BRENNAN and Justice MARSHALL join,
dissenting in part.
Only two years ago, this Court reaffirmed that the
terms of a treaty between the United States and an
Indian tribe must be construed " 'in the sense in
which they would naturally be understood by the
Indians.' " Washington v. Fishing Vessel Assn., 443
U.S. 658, 676, 99 S.Ct. 3055, 3070, 61 L.Ed.2d 823
(1979), quoting from Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1,
11, 20 S.Ct. 1, 5, 44 L.Ed. 49 (1899). In holding
today that the bed of the Big Horn River passed to
the State of Montana upon its admission to the
Union, the Court disregards this settled rule of
statutory construction. Because I believe that the
United States intended, and the Crow Nation
understood, that the bed of the Big Horn was to
© 2005 ThomsonAVest. No
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belong to the Crow Indians, I dissent from so much
of the Court's opinion as holds otherwise. [FN1]
FN1. While the complaint in this case
sought to quiet title only to the bed of the
Big Horn River, see ante at 1250, n. 1, I
think it plain that if the bed of the river was
reserved to the Crow Indians before
statehood, so also were the banks up to the
high-water mark.
I
As in any case involving the construction of a
treaty, it is necessary at the outset to determine what
the parties intended. *570 Washington v. Fishing
Vessel Assn., 443 U.S., at 675, 99 S.Ct, at 3069.
With respect to an Indian treaty, the Court has said
that "the United States, as the party with the
presumptively superior negotiating skills and
superior knowledge of the language in which the
treaty is recorded, has a responsibility to avoid
taking advantage of the other side." Id, at 675-676,
99 S.Ct, at 3069-3070. Obviously, this rule is
applicable here. But before determining what the
Crow Indians must have understood the Treaties of
Fort Laramie to mean, it is appropriate to ask what
the United States intended, for our inquiry need go
no further if the United States meant to convey the
bed of the Big Horn River to the Indians.
The Court concedes that the establishment of an
Indian reservation can be an "appropriate public
purpose" justifying a **1260 congressional
conveyance of a riverbed. Ante, at 1253. It holds,
however, that no such public purpose or exigency
could have existed here, since at the time of the Fort
Laramie Treaties the Crow were a nomadic tribe
dependent chiefly upon buffalo, and fishing was not
important to their diet or way of life. Ibid. The
factual premise upon which the Court bases its
conclusion is open to serious question: while the
District Court found that fish were not "a central
part of the Crow diet," 457 F.Supp. 599, 602
(Mont. 1978), there was evidence at trial that the
Crow ate fish both as a supplement to their buffalo
diet and as a substitute for meat in time of scarcity.
[FN2]
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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FN2. See 1 App. 39-40 (testimony of Joe
Medicine Crow, Tribal Historian). See
also id, at 90, 97 (testimony of Henry Old
Coyote). Thus, while one historian has
stated that "I have never met a reference to
eating of fish" by the Crow Indians, R.
Lowie, The Crow Indians 72 (1935), it is
clear that such references do exist. See
457 F.Supp., at 602. See also n. 7, infra.
Even if it were true that fishing was not important
to the Crow Indians at the time the Fort Laramie
Treaties came into being, it does not necessarily
follow that there was no public purpose or exigency
that could have led Congress to *571 convey the
riverbed to the Crow. Indeed, history informs us
that the very opposite was true. In negotiating
these treaties, the United States was actuated by two
somewhat conflicting purposes: the desire to
provide for the Crow Indians, and the desire to
obtain the cession of all Crow territory not within
the ultimate reservation's boundaries. Retention of
ownership of the riverbed for the benefit of the
future State of Montana would have been
inconsistent with each of these purposes.
First: It was the intent of the United States that the
Crow Indians be converted from a nomadic, hunting
tribe to a settled, agricultural people. [FN3] The
Treaty of Fort Laramie of Sept. 17, 1851, see 11
Stat. 749, and 2 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws
and Treaties 594 (1904) (hereinafter Kappler), was
precipitated by the depletion of game, timber, and
forage by the constantly increasing number of
settlers who crossed the lands of the Plains Indians
on their way to California. Aggrieved by these
depredations, the Indians had opposed that passage,
sometimes by force. [FN4] In order to ensure safe
passage for the settlers, the United States in 1851
called together at Fort Laramie eight Indian
Nations, including the Crow. The pronouncement
made at that time by the United States
Commissioner emphasized the Government's
concern over the destruction of the game upon
which the Indians depended. [FN5] The treaty's
Art. 5, which set specified *572 boundaries for the
Indian Nations, explicitly provided that the
signatory tribes "do not surrender the privilege of

hunting, fishing, or passing over any of the tracts"
described in the treaty, 2 Kappler, at 595 (emphasis
added), and, further, its Art. 7 stated that the United
States would provide an annuity in the form of
"provisions, merchandise, domestic animals, and
agricultural implements." Ibid.
FN3. See generally United States v. Sioux
Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 380, n.
11, 100 S.Ct. 2716, 2722, n. 11, 65
L.Ed.2d 844 (1980) (discussing federal
reservation policy).
FN4. The history of the events leading up
to the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851 is
recounted in detail in Crow Tribe of
Indians v. United States, 151 Ct.Cl. 281,
284 F.2d 361 (1960), cert, denied, 366
U.S. 924, 81 S.Ct. 1350, 6 L.Ed.2d 383
(1961); Crow Nation v. United States, 81
CtCl. 238 (1935); and Fort Berthold
Indians v. United States, 71 Ct.Cl. 308
(1930).
FN5. According to an account published in
the Saint Louis Republican, Oct. 26, 1851,
Treaty Commissioner Mitchell stated:
"The ears of your Great Father are always
open to the complaints of his Red
Children. He has heard and is aware that
your buffalo and game are driven off and
your grass and timber consumed by the
opening of roads and the passing of
emigrants through your countries. For
these losses he desires to compensate you."
Quoted in Crow Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 151 Ct.Cl., at 290, 284
F.2d, at 366.
The same concern was expressed in
internal
communications
of
the
Government. See, e. g, id, at 287-288,
284 F.2d, at 365 (letter of W. Medill,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the
Secretary of the Interior).
**1261 The intent of the United States to provide
alternative means of subsistence for the Plains
Indians is demonstrated even more clearly by the
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subsequent Fort Laramie Treaty of May 7, 1868,
between the United States and the Crow Nation.
15 Stat. 649. United States Commissioner Taylor,
who met with the Crow Indians in 1867, had
acknowledged to them that the game upon which
they relied was "fast disappearing," and had stated
that the United States proposed to furnish them with
"homes and cattle, to enable you to begin to raise a
supply or stock with which to support your families
when the game has disappeared."
[FN6]
Proceedings of the Great Peace Commission of
18671868, pp. 86-87 (Institute for the
Development of Indian Law (1975)) (hereinafter
Proceedings). Given this clear recognition by the
United States that the traditional mainstay of the
Crow Indians' diet was disappearing, it is
inconceivable that the United States intended by the
1868 treaty to deprive the Crow of "potential
control over a source of food on their *573
reservation." [FN7] United States v. Finch, 548
F.2d 822, 832 (CA9 1976), vacated on other
grounds, 433 U.S. 676, 97 S.Ct. 2909, 53 L.Ed.2d
1048 (1977). See Alaska Pacific Fisheries v.
United States, 248 U.S. 78, 39 S.Ct. 40, 63 L.Ed.
138(1918). [FN8]
FN6. The 1868 treaty provided that
members of the Crow Tribe who
commenced farming would be allotted
land and given agricultural supplies; it also
provided that subsistence rations for a
period of four years would be supplied to
every Indian who agreed to settle on the
reservation. See Arts. VI, VIII, and IX of
the treaty, 15 Stat. 650-652.
FN7. It is significant that in 1873 the
United States Commissioners who sought
to negotiate a further diminishment of the
Crow Reservation were instructed by the
very Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 321, 17 Stat.
626, that "if there is upon such reservation
a locality where fishing could be valuable
to the Indians, [they should] include the
same [in the diminished reservation] if
practicable...."
That those fishing rights would have been
valuable to the Crow Indians is suggested
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim

by the statement of Chief Blackfoot at the
1867 Fort Laramie Conference:
"There is plenty of buffalo, deer, elk, and
antelope in my country. There is plenty of
beaver in all the streams. There is plenty
offish too. I never yet heard of any of the
Crow Nation dying of starvation. I know
that the game is fast decreasing, and
whenever it gets scarce, I will tell my
Great Father. That will be time enough to
go
farming."
Proceedings,
at 91.
(Emphasis added.)
Edwin Thompson Denig, a white fur trader
who resided in Crow territory from
approximately 1833 until 1856, also
remarked:
"Every creek and river teems with beaver,
and good fish and fowl can be had at any
stream in the proper season." E. Denig,
Of the Crow Nation 21 (1980).
FN8. In Alaska Pacific Fisheries, the
United States sued to enjoin a commercial
fishing company from maintaining a fish
trap in navigable waters off the Annette
Islands in Alaska, which had been set aside
for the Metlakahtla Indians. The lower
courts granted the relief sought, and this
Court affirmed. The Court noted: "That
Congress had power to make the
reservation inclusive of the adjacent waters
and submerged land as well as the upland
needs little more than statement." 248
U.S., at 87, 39 S.Ct, at 41. This was
because the reservation was a setting aside
of public property "for a recognized public
purpose-that
of
safe-guarding
and
advancing a dependent Indian people
dwelling within the United States." Id, at
88, 39 S.Ct., at 41. The Court observed
that "[t]he Indians naturally looked on the
fishing grounds as part of the islands," and
it found further support for its conclusion
"in the general rule that statutes passed for
the benefit of dependent Indian tribes or
communities are to be liberally construed,
doubtful expressions being resolved in
favor of the Indians." Id, at 89, 39 S.Ct,
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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623, 90 S.Ct, at 1330. While the Fort
Laramie Treaty of 1851 may have been
designed primarily to assure safe passage
for settlers crossing Indian lands, by 1868
settlers and miners were remaining in
Montana. See N. Plummer, Crow Indians
109-114 (1974). Accordingly, whereas
the signatory tribes, by Art. 5 of the 1851
treaty did not "abandon or prejudice any
rights or claims they may have to other
lands," see 2 Kappler, at 595, by Art. II of
the 1868 treaty the Crow Indians
"relinquish [ed] all title, claims, or rights in
and to any portion of the territory of the
United States, except such as is embraced
within the [reservation] limits aforesaid."
15 Stat. 650.

at 42.
Second: The establishment of the Crow
Reservation was *574 necessitated by the same
"public purpose" or "exigency" that led to the
creation of the Choctaw and Cherokee Reservations
discussed in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397
U.S. 620, 90 S.Ct. 1328, 25 L.Ed.2d 615 (1970).
In both cases, Congress responded to pressure for
Indian land by establishing reservations in return for
the Indians' relinquishment of their claims to other
territories. [FN9] Just as the Choctaws **1262 and
the Cherokees received their reservation in fee
simple " 'to inure to them while they shall exist as a
nation and live on it,' " id, at 625, 90 S.Ct., at 1331,
so the Crow were assured in 1867 that they would
receive "a tract of your country as a home for
yourselves and children forever, upon which your
great Father will not permit the white man to
trespass." Proceedings, at 86. Indeed, during the
negotiations of both the 1851 and 1868 Treaties of
Fort Laramie the United States repeatedly referred
to the land as belonging to the Indians, and the
treaties reflect this understanding. [FN 10] *575
Finally, like the Cherokee Reservation, see 397
U.S., at 628, the Crow Reservation created by Art.
II of the 1868 treaty consisted of "one undivided
tract of land described merely by exterior metes and
bounds." 15 Stat. 650.

FN 10. See Crow Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 151 Ct.CL, at 288-291, 284
F.2d at 365-367; Proceedings, at 86. The
Court suggests that the 1851 treaty was
simply "a covenant among several tribes
which recognized specific boundaries for
their respective territories." Ante, at 1252.
But this interpretation of the treaty
consistently has been rejected by the Court
of Claims, which has held that the treaty
recognized title in the signatory Indian
Nations. See Crow Tribe of Indians, 151
CLCL, at 291, 284 F.2d, at 367; Crow
Nation v. United States, 81 Ct.CL, at
271-272; Fort Berthold Indians v. United
States, 71 Ct.CL 308 (1930). Further, the
Court's interpretation is contrary to the
analysis of the 1851 treaty made in
Shoshone Indians v. United States,324
U.S. 335, 349, 65 S.Ct. 690, 697, 89 L.Ed.
985
(1945)
("the
circumstances
surrounding the execution of the Fort
Laramie treaty [of 1851] indicate a
purpose to recognize the Indian title to the
lands described").
In any event, as the Court concedes, ante,
at 1252, it is beyond dispute that the 1868
treaty set apart a reservation "for the
absolute
and undisturbed
use and
occupation" of the Crow Indians. Cf.

FN9. That the Choctaws and Cherokees
were forced to leave their original
homeland entirely, while the Crow were
forced to accept repeated diminishments of
their territory, does not distinguish
Choctaw Nation from this case; indeed, if
anything, that distinction suggests that the
Crow Indians would have had an even
greater expectancy than did the Choctaws
and Cherokees that the rivers encompassed
by their reservation would continue to
belong to them. The "public purpose"
behind the creation of these reservations in
each case was the same: "to provide room
for the increasing numbers of new settlers
who were encroaching upon Indian lands
during
their
westward
migrations."
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S., at
© 2005 Thomson/West. No
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United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians,
448 U.S., at 374-376, 100 S.Ct, at
2719-2721
(discussing
the
similar
provisions of the Fort Laramie Treaty of
April 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635, between the
United States and the Sioux Nation).
Since essentially the same "public purpose" led to
the creation of both reservations, it is highly
appropriate that the analysis of Choctaw Nation be
applied in this case. As the State of Montana does
here, the State of Oklahoma in Choctaw Nation
claimed a riverbed that was surrounded on both
sides by lands granted to an Indian tribe. This
Court in Choctaw Nation found Oklahoma's claim
to be "at the least strained," and held that all the
land inside the reservation's exterior metes and
bounds, including the riverbed, "seems clearly
encompassed within the grant." even though no
mention had been made of the bed. 397 U.S., at
628, 90 S.Ct, at 1333. The Court found that the
"natural inference" to be drawn from the grants to
the Choctaws and Cherokees was that "all the land
within their metes and bounds was conveyed,
including the banks and bed of rivers." Id, at 634,
90 S.Ct, at 1336. See also Donnelly v. United
States, 228 U.S. 243, 259, 33 S.Ct. 449, 453, 57
L.Ed. 820 (1913). The *576 Court offers no
plausible explanation for its failure to draw the
same "natural inference" here. [FN 11]
FN11. As noted above, neither the "special
historical origins" of the Choctaw and
Cherokee treaties, nor the provisions of
those treaties granting Indian lands in fee
simple, serve to distinguish this case from
Choctaw Nation. Equally unpersuasive is
the suggestion that in Choctaw the Court
placed
"special
emphasis
on
the
Government's promise that the reserved
lands would never become part of any
State." Ante, at 1253, n. 5. Rather than
placing
"special
emphasis"
on
this
promise, the Choctaw Court indicated only
that the promise reinforced the conclusion
that the Court drew from an analysis of the
language of conveyance contained in the
treaties. 397 U.S., at 635, 90 S.Ct, at 1336

**1263 In Choctaw Nation, the State of Oklahoma
also laid claim to a portion of the Arkansas River at
the border of the Indian reservation. The Court's
analysis of that claim lends weight to the conclusion
that the bed of the Big Horn belongs to the Crow
Indians. Interpreting the treaty language setting the
boundary of the Cherokee Reservation "down the
main channel of the Arkansas river," the Choctaw
Court noted that such language repeatedly has been
held to convey title to the midpoint of the channel,
relying on Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United
States, 260 U.S. 77, 43 S.Ct. 60, 67 L.Ed. 140
(1922). [FN12] 397 U.S., at 631-633, 90 S.Ct, at
1334-1335. Here, Art. II of the 1868 Treaty of
*577 Fort Laramie established the boundary of the
Crow Reservation as running in part up the
"mid-channel of the Yellowstone river." 15 Stat.
650. Thus, under Brewer-Elliott
and
Choctaw
Nation, it is clear that the United States intended to
grant the Crow the bed of the Yellowstone to the
mid-point of the channel; it follows a fortiori that it
was the intention of the United States to grant the
Crow Indians the bed of that portion of the Big
Horn that was totally encompassed by the
reservation. [FN 13]
FN12. In Brewer-Elliott, the United States
established a reservation for the Osage
Indians that was bounded on one side "by
... the main channel of the Arkansas river."
260 U.S., at 81, 43 S.Ct, at 62. This
Court held that the portion of the Arkansas
River in question was nonnavigable and
that "the title of the Osages as granted
certainly included the bed of the river as
far as the main channel, because the words
of the grant expressly carry the title to that
liner Id, at 87, 43 S.Ct, at 64 (Emphasis
added). While the Court purported to
reserve the question whether vesting
ownership of the riverbed in the Osage
Indians
would
have
constituted
an
appropriate "public purpose" within the
meaning of Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1,
14 S.Ct. 548, 38 L.Ed. 331 (1894), if the
stream had been navigable, that question
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essentially had been resolved four years
earlier in Alaska Pacific Fisheries. See n.
8, supra. In any event, Choctaw Nation
clearly holds, and the Court concedes, ante
, at 1253, that the establishment of an
Indian reservation can be an "appropriate
public purpose" within the meaning of
Shively v. Bowlby.
FN13.
Later
events
confirm
this
conclusion. In 1891, the Crow Indians
made a further cession of territory. See
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, § 31, 26 Stat. 1040.
This cession was bounded in part by the
Big Horn River. Significantly, the Act,
described the boundary of the cession as
the "mid-channel" of the river; that
language necessarily indicates that the
Crow owned the entire bed of the Big
Horn prior to the cession, and that by the
Act they were ceding half the bed in the
affected stretch of the river, while retaining
the other half in that stretch and the whole
of the bed in the portion of the river that
remained surrounded by their lands.
II
But even assuming, arguendo, that the United
States intended to retain title to the bed of the Big
Horn River for the benefit of the future State of
Montana, it defies common sense to suggest that the
Crow Indians would have so understood the terms
of the Fort Laramie Treaties. [FN 14] In negotiating
the 1851 treaty, the United States repeatedly
referred to the territories at issue as "your country,"
as "your land," and as "your territory." See Crow
Tribe of Indians v. United States, 151 Ct.Cl. 281,
287-291, 284 F.2d 361, 364-367 (1960). Further,
in Art. 3 of the treaty itself the Government
undertook to protect the signatory tribes "against
the commission of all depredations by the people of
the said United States," and to compensate the
tribes for any damages *578 they suffered thereby;
in return, in Art. 2, the United States received the
right to build roads and military posts on the
Indians' territories. 2 Kappler, at 594.
FN 14. Counsel for the State of Montana

acknowledged at oral argument that the
Crow Indians did not understand the
meaning of the equal-footing doctrine at
the times they entered into the Fort
Laramie Treaties. Tr. of Oral Arg. 13-14.
The history of the treaty of 1868 is even more
telling. By this time, whites were no longer simply
passing through the Indian territories on their way
to California. Instead, in the words of United
States Commissioner Taylor, who addressed the
Crow representatives gathered at Fort Laramie in
1867:
"We learn that valuable mines have been
discovered in your country which in some
instances are taken possession of by the whites.
We learn that roads are laid out and travelled
through your land, that settlements have been
made upon your **1264 lands, that your game is
being driven away and is fast disappearing. We
know also that the white people are rapidly
increasing and are taking possession of and
occupying all the valuable lands. Under these
circumstances we are sent by the great Father and
the Great Council in Washington to arrange some
plan to relieve you, as far as possible, from the
bad consequences of this state of things and to
protect
you
from
future
difficulties."
Proceedings, at 86. (Emphasis added.)
It is hardly credible that the Crow Indians who
heard this declaration would have understood that
the United States meant to retain the ownership of
the riverbed that ran through the very heart of the
land the United States promised to set aside for the
Indians and their children "forever." Indeed, Chief
Blackfoot, when addressed by Commissioner
Taylor, responded: "The Crows used to own all this
Country including all the rivers of the West." Id, at
88. (Emphasis added.) The conclusion is
inescapable that the Crow Indians understood that
they retained the ownership of at least those rivers
within the metes and bounds of the reservation *579
granted them. [FN 15] This understanding could
only have been strengthened by the reference in the
1868 treaty to the mid-channel of the Yellowstone
River as part of the boundary of the reservation; the
most likely interpretation that the Crow could have
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placed on that reference is that half the Yellowstone
belonged to them, and it is likely that they
accordingly deduced that all of the rivers within the
boundary of the reservation belonged to them.
FN 15. Statements made by
Chief
Blackfoot during the treaty negotiations of
1873 buttress this conclusion. See, e. g, 3
App. 136 ("The Great Spirit made these
mountains and rivers for us, and all this
land"); id, at 171 ("On the other side of
the river all those streams belong to the
Crows").
In fact, any other conclusion would lead to absurd
results. Gold had been discovered in Montana in
1858, and sluicing operations had begun on a
stream in western Montana in 1862; hundreds of
prospectors were lured there by this news, and some
penetrated Crow territory. N. Plummer, Crow
Indians 109-110 (1974). As noted, Commissioner
Taylor remarked in 1867 that whites were mining in
Indian territory, and he specifically indicated that
the United States intended to protect the Indians
from such intrusions. Yet the result reached by the
Court today indicates that Montana or its licensees
would have been free to enter upon the Big Horn
River for the purpose of removing minerals from its
bed or banks; farther, in the Court's view, they
remain free to do so in the future. The Court's
answer to a similar claim made by the State of
Oklahoma in Choctaw Nation is frilly applicable
here: "We do not believe that [the Indians] would
have considered that they could have been
precluded from exercising these basic ownership
rights to the river bed, and we think it very unlikely
that the United States intended otherwise." [FN 16]
397 U.S., at 635, 90 S.Ct, at 1336.
FN 16. The Court suggests that the fact the
United States retained a navigational
easement in the Big Horn River indicates
that the 1868 treaty could not have granted
the Crow the exclusive right to occupy all
the territory within the reservation
boundary. Ante, at 1253. But the
retention of a navigational easement
obviously does not preclude a finding that
© 2005 Thomson/West. No

the United States meant to convey the land
beneath the navigable water. See, e. g.
Choctaw Nation, supra; Alaska Pacific
Fisheries, 248 U.S. 78, 39 S.Ct. 40, 63
L.Ed. 138(1918).
*580 III
In Choctaw Nation, the Court was confronted with
a claim almost identical to that made by the State of
Montana in this case. There, as here, the argument
was made that the silence of the treaties in question
with regard to the ownership of the disputed
riverbeds was fatal to the Indians' case. In both
cases, the state claimant placed its principal reliance
on this Court's statement in United States v. Holt
State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55, 46 S.Ct. 197, 199, 70
L.Ed. 465 (1926), that the conveyance of a riverbed
"should not be regarded as intended unless the
intention was definitely declared or otherwise made
very plain." The Court flatly rejected this
argument in Choctaw Nation, pointing out that
"nothing in **1265 the Holt State Bank case or in
the policy underlying its rule of construction ...
requires that courts blind themselves to the
circumstances of the grant in determining the intent
of the grantor." [FN17] * 581397 U.S., at 634, 90
S.Ct, at 1336. Since I believe that the Court has so
blinded itself today, I respectfully dissent from its
holding that the State of Montana has title to the
bed of the Big Horn River. [FN 18]
FN 17. The Court's reliance on Holt State
Bank is misplaced for other reasons as
well. At issue in that case was the bed of
Mud Lake, a once navigable body of water
in the Red Lake Reservation in Minnesota.
Prior to the case, most of the reservation,
and all the tracts surrounding the lake, had
been "relinquished and ceded" by the
Indians and sold off to homesteaders. 270
U.S., at 52-53, 46 S.Ct, at 198. No such
circumstances are present here. See n. 18,
infra.
Moreover, a critical distinction between
this case and Holt State Bank arises from
the questionable status of the Red Lake
Reservation before Minnesota became a
State. The Court in Holt State Bank
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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concluded that in the treaties preceding
statehood there had been, with respect to
the Red Lake area-unlike other areas-"no
formal setting apart of what was not ceded,
nor any affirmative declaration of the
rights of the Indians therein...." 270 U.S.,
at 58, 46 S.Ct., at 200 (footnote omitted).
Thus, Holt State Bank clearly does not
control a case, such as this one, in which,
prior to statehood, the United States set
apart by formal treaty a reservation that
included navigable waters. See n. 10,
supra.
Finally, the Court fails to recognize that it
is Holt State Bank, not Choctaw Nation,
that stands as "a singular exception" to this
Court's established line of cases involving
claims to submerged lands adjacent to or
encompassed by Indian reservations. See
Choctaw Nation; Brewer-Elliott; Alaska
Pacific Fisheries; Donnelly v. United
Suites, all supra.

Justice STEVENS, concurring.
In its opinion in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397
U.S. 620, 90 S.Ct. 1328, 25 L.Ed.2d 615, the Court
repeatedly pointed out that ambiguities in the
governing treaties should be resolved in favor of the
Indian tribes. [FNl] That emphasis on a rule of
construction favoring the tribes might arguably be
read as having been intended to indicate that the
strong presumption against dispositions *568 by the
United States of land under navigable waters in the
territories is not applicable to Indian reservations.
However, for the following reasons, I do not so read
the Choctaw Nation opinion.

FNl 8. I agree with the Court's resolution
of the question of the power of the Tribe to
regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on
reservation land owned in fee by
nonmembers of the Tribe. I note only that
nothing in the Court's disposition of that
issue is inconsistent with the conclusion
that the bed of the Big Horn River belongs
to the Crow Indians. There is no
suggestion that any parcels alienated in
consequence of the Indian General
Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, or the
Crow Allotment Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 751,
included portions of the bed of the Big
Horn River. Further, the situation here is
wholly unlike that in Puyallup Tribe v.
Washington Game Dept, 433 U.S. 165, 97
S.Ct. 2616, 53 L.Ed.2d 667 (1977). As
the Court recognizes, ante, at 1256, the
Puyallups alienated, in fee simple, the
great majority of the lands in the
reservation, including all the land abutting
the Puyallup River. 433 U.S., at 173-174,
and n. 11, 97 S.Ct, at 2621-2622, and n.
11. This is not such a case.

FNl. The Court described this rule of
construction, and explained the reasoning
underlying it:
"[T]hese treaties are not to be considered
as exercises in ordinary conveyancing.
The Indian Nations did not seek out the
United States and agree upon an exchange
of lands in an arm's-length transaction.
Rather, treaties were imposed upon them
and they had no choice but to consent. As
a consequence, this Court has often held
that treaties with the Indians must be
interpreted as they would have understood
them, see, e. g.t Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S.
1, 11, 20 S.Ct. 1, 5, 44 L.Ed. 49 (1899),
and any doubtful expressions in them
should be resolved in the Indians' favor.
See Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United
States, 248 U.S. 78, 89, 39 S.Ct. 40, 41, 63
L.Ed. 138 (1918). Indeed, the Treaty of
Dancing Rabbit Creek itself provides that
'in the construction of this Treaty wherever
well founded doubt shall arise, it shall be
construed most favourably towards the
Choctaws.' 7 Stat. 336." 397 U.S.,
630-631, 90 S.Ct, at 1334.
The Court went on to base its decision on
this rule of construction: "[T]he court in [
United States v.] Holt State Bank [270
U.S. 49, 46 S.Ct. 197, 70 L.Ed. 465] itself
examined the circumstances in detail and
concluded 'the reservation was not
intended to effect such a disposal.' 270
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U.S., at 58 [46 S.Ct, at 200]. We think
that the similar conclusion of the Court of
Appeals in this case was in error, given the
circumstances of the treaty grants and the
countervailing rule of construction that
well-founded doubt should be resolved in
petitioners' favor." Id. at 634, 90 S.Ct., at
1336.
In United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49,
46 S.Ct. 197, 70 L.Ed. 465, the **1266 Court
unanimously and unequivocally had held that the
presumption applied to Indian reservations.
Although the references to Holt State Bank in the
Court's opinion in Choctaw Nation can hardly be
characterized as enthusiastic, see 397 U.S., at 634,
90 S.Ct., at 1336, the Choctaw Nation opinion did
not purport to abandon or to modify the rule of Holt
State Bank. Indeed, Justice Douglas, while joining
the opinion of the Court, wrote a separate opinion to
explain why he had concluded that the Choctaw
Nation
record
supplied
the
"exceptional
circumstances" required under the Holt State Bank
rule. [FN2]
FN2. Before reviewing the history of the
Cherokee and Choctaw Reservations,
Justice Douglas wrote:
"[W]hile the United States holds a domain
as a territory, it may convey away the right
to the bed of a navigable river, not
retaining that property for transfer to a
future State, though as stated in Holt State
Bank that purpose is 'not lightly to be
inferred, and should not be regarded as
intended unless the intention was definitely
declared or otherwise made very plain.'
270 U.S., at 55 [46 S.Ct., at 199]. Such
exceptional circumstances are present
here." 397 U.S., at 639, 90 S.Ct, at 1338.

the Holt State Bank rule. Because only four
Justices, including Justice Douglas, joined the
Court's opinion, I do not believe it should be read as
having made a substantial change in settled law.
FN3. When Choctaw Nation was decided,
the Court consisted of only eight active
Justices.
Justice
Harlan
did
not
participate in the consideration or decision
of Choctaw Nation.
*569 Finally, it is significant for me that Justice
STEWART, who joined the Choctaw Nation
opinion, is the author of the Court's opinion today.
Just as he is, I am satisfied that the circumstances of
the Choctaw Nation case differ significantly from
the circumstances of this case. Whether I would
have voted differently in the two cases if I had been
a Member of the Court when Choctaw Nation was
decided is a question I cannot answer. I am,
however, convinced that unless the Court is to
create a broad exception for Indian reservations, the
Holt State Bank presumption is controlling. I
therefore join the Court's opinion.
450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493
Briefs and Other Related Documents (Back to
top)
• 1980 WL 339348 (Appellate Brief) Brief for the
Petitioners (Jul. 28, 1980)
• 1980 WL 339347 (Appellate Brief) Petitioners'
Reply Brief (Mar. 17, 1980)
END OF DOCUMENT

Only seven Justices participated in the Choctaw
Nation decision. [FN3] Justice WHITE, joined by
THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice Black in dissent,
relied heavily on the Holt State Bank line of
authority, see 397 U.S., at 645- 648, 90 S.Ct, at
1341-1343, and, as I noted above, Justice Douglas,
in his concurrence, also appears to have accepted
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Order on remand, 573 F.2d 1137.
Briefs and Other Related Documents
Supreme Court of the United States
Mark David OLIPHANT and Daniel B. Belgarde,
Petitioners,
v.
The SUQUAMISH INDIAN TRIBE et al.
No. 76-5729.
Argued Jan. 9,1978.
Decided March 6, 1978. [FN*]
FN* Together with Belgarde v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe et al, on certiorari before
judgment to the same court (see this
Court's Rule 23(5)).
Criminal proceedings were brought in the
Suquamish Indian Provisional Court against two
non-Indian residents of the Port Madison
Reservation. Both petitioners applied for a writ of
habeas corpus to the United States District Court for
the Western District of Washington, arguing that the
tribal court does not have criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. In separate proceedings, the District
Court denied the petitions. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, 544 F.2d 1007, affirmed in
one case, and the other petitioner's appeal was
pending before the Court of Appeals. Upon
granting certiorari, the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, held that Indian tribal courts do not have
inherent criminal jurisdiction to try and to punish
non-Indians, and hence may not assume such
jurisdiction unless specifically authorized to do so
by Congress.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Marshall, with whom Mr. Chief
Justice Burger joined, filed a dissenting opinion.

West Headnotes
[1] Indians €==>38(2)
209k38(2) Most Cited Cases
Indian tribal courts do not have inherent criminal
jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indians, and
hence may not assume such jurisdiction unless
specifically authorized to do so by Congress.
[2] Indians €^38(2)
209k38(2) Most Cited Cases
Neither the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 nor
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 addresses, let
alone "confirms," tribal criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians; the Indian Reorganization Act merely
gives each Indian tribe the right to organize for its
common welfare and to adopt an appropriate
constitution and bylaws, and the Indian Civil Rights
Act merely extends to a person within the tribe's
jurisdiction certain enumerated guarantees of the
Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution. Indian
Reorganization Act, §§ 1 et seq., 16, 25 U.S.C.A. §§
461 et seq., 476; Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 202,
25 U.S.C.A. § 1302.
[3] Indians €^38(2)
209k38(2) Most Cited Cases
Although an early version of the Indian Civil Rights
Act extended its guarantees only to American
Indians, rather than to any person, and although the
purpose of a later modification was to extend the
Act's guarantees to "all persons who may be subject
to jurisdiction of tribal governments whether
Indians or non-Indians," this change was not
intended to give Indian tribes criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians; instead, the modification merely
demonstrated Congress* desire to extend the Act's
guarantees to non-Indians if and where they come
under a tribe's criminal or civil jurisdiction by either
treaty provision or act of Congress. Civil Rights
Act of 1968, § 202, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1302.

> 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

http://printwestlaw.com/delivery.html?dest=atD&format=HTMT F#Hat^H=A nn^snnnn

non cnr\r\c

98 S.Ct. 1011

Page 2

435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209
(Cite as: 435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011)
[4] Indians €^38(2)
209k38(2) Most Cited Cases
From the earliest treaties with Indian tribes, it was
assumed that the tribes, few of which maintained
any semblance of a formal court system, did not
have inherent criminal jurisdiction to try and to
punish non-Indians, absent a congressional statute
or treaty provision to that effect.
[5] Indians €=^38(2)
209k38(2) Most Cited Cases
Congressional actions during the 19th century
reflected that body's belief that Indian tribes do not
have
inherent
criminal
jurisdiction
over
non-Indians. 18U.S.C.A. §§ 1152, 1153.
[6] Indians €=^38(2)
209k38(2) Most Cited Cases
The presumption, commonly shared by Congress,
the executive branch, and the lower federal courts,
that Indian tribal courts have no power to try
non-Indians carries considerable weight.
[7] Indians €=^3(3)
209k3(3) Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 209k3)
[7] Indians €==>6.3(1)
209k6.3(l) Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 209k6(2), 209k6)
In interpreting Indian treaties and statutes, doubtful
expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak
and defenseless people who are the wards of the
nation, dependent upon its protection and good
faith; but treaty and statutory provisions which are
not clear on their face may be clear from the
surrounding circumstances and legislative history.
[8] Indians €=^38(2)
209k38(2) Most Cited Cases
By submitting to the overriding sovereignty of
United States, Indian tribes necessarily yield the
power to try non-Indians except in a manner
acceptable to Congress.
**1012 Syllabus [FN*]
FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the
opinion of the Court but has been prepared
© 2005 Thomson/West. No

by the Reporter of Decisions for the
convenience of the reader. See United
States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,
200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50
L.Ed.2d 499.
*191 Indian tribal courts do not have inherent
criminal jurisdiction to try and to punish
non-Indians, and hence may not assume such
jurisdiction unless specifically authorized to do so
by Congress. Pp. 1014-1022.
(a) From the earliest treaties with Indian tribes, it
was assumed that the tribes, few of which
maintained any semblance of a formal court system,
did not have such jurisdiction absent a
congressional statute or treaty provision to that
effect, and at least one court held that such
jurisdiction did not exist. Pp. 1015-1017.
(b) Congress' actions during the 19th century
reflected that body's belief that Indian tribes do not
have
inherent
criminal
jurisdiction
over
non-Indians. Pp. 1017-1019.
(c) The presumption, commonly shared by
Congress, the Executive Branch, and lower federal
courts, that tribal courts have no power to try
non-Indians, carries considerable weight. Pp.
1019-1020.
(d) By submitting to the overriding sovereignty of
the United States, Indian tribes necessarily yield the
power to try non-Indians except in a manner
acceptable to Congress, a fact which seems to be
recognized by the Treaty of Point Elliott, signed by
the Suquamish Indian Tribe. Pp. 1019-1022.
544 F.2d 1007 (Oliphant judgment), and Belgarde
judgment, reversed.
Philip P. Malone,
petitioners.

Poulsbo,

Wash.,

for

the

Slade Gorton, Arty. Gen., Olympia, Wash., for the
State of Washington, as amicus curiae, by special
leave of Court.
*192 Barry

D.

Ernstoff,

Seattle, Wash.,

for
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respondents.
H. Bartow Fair, III, for the United States, as
amicus curiae, by special leave of Court.
**1013 Mr. Justice REHNQUIST delivered the
opinion of the Court.
Two hundred years ago, the area bordering Puget
Sound consisted of a large number of politically
autonomous Indian villages, each occupied by from
a few dozen to over 100 Indians. These loosely
related villages were aggregated into a series of
Indian tribes, one of which, the Suquamish, has
become the focal point of this litigation. By the
1855 Treaty of Point Elliott, 12 Stat. 927, the
Suquamish Indian Tribe *193 relinquished all rights
that it might have had in the lands of the State of
Washington and agreed to settle on a 7,276-acre
reservation near Port Madison, Wash. Located on
Puget Sound across from the city of Seattle, the Port
Madison Reservation is a checkerboard of tribal
community land, allotted Indian lands, property
held in fee simple by non-Indians, and various roads
and public highways maintained by Kitsap County.
[FN1]
FN1. According to the District Court's
findings of fact "[The] Madison Indian
Reservation consists of approximately
7276 acres of which approximately 63%
thereof is owned in fee simple absolute by
non-Indians and the remainder 37% is
Indian-owned lands subject to the trust
status of the United States, consisting
mostly of unimproved acreage upon which
no persons reside. Residing on the
reservation is an estimated population of
approximately 2928 non-Indians living in
976 dwelling units. There lives on the
reservation approximately 50 members of
the Suquamish Indian Tribe. Within the
reservation are numerous public highways
of the State of Washington, public schools,
public utilities and other facilities in which
neither the Suquamish Indian Tribe nor the
United States has any ownership or
interest." App. 75. The Suquamish Indian

Tribe, unlike many other Indian tribes, did
not consent to non-Indian homesteading of
unallotted or "surplus" lands within their
reservation pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 348
and 43 U.S.C. §§ 1 195-1197. Instead, the
substantial non-Indian population on the
Port Madison Reservation is primarily the
result of the sale of Indian allotments to
non-Indians by the Secretary of the
Interior. Congressional legislation has
allowed such sales where the allotments
were in heirship, fell to "incompetents," or
were surrendered in lieu of other
selections. The substantial non-Indian
landholdings on the Reservation are also a
result of the lifting of various trust
restrictions, a factor which has enabled
individual Indians to sell their allotments.
See 25 U.S.C. §§349,392.
The Suquamish Indians are governed by a tribal
government which in 1973 adopted a Law and
Order Code. The Code, which covers a variety of
offenses from theft to rape, purports to extend the
Tribe's criminal jurisdiction over both Indians and
non-Indians. [FN2] Proceedings are held in the
Suquamish *194 Indian Provisional Court.
Pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82
Stat. 77, 25 U.S.C. § 1302, defendants are entitled
to many of the due process protections accorded to
defendants in federal or state criminal proceedings.
[FN3] However, the guarantees are not identical.
Non-Indians, for example, are excluded from
Suquamish tribal court juries. [FN4]
FN2. Notices were placed in prominent
places at the entrances to the Port Madison
Reservation informing the public that entry
onto the Reservation would be deemed
implied consent to the criminal jurisdiction
of the Suquamish tribal court.
FN3. In Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 16
S.Ct. 986, 41 L.Ed. 196 (1896), this Court
held that the Bill of Rights in the Federal
Constitution does not apply to Indian tribal
governments.
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FN4. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
provides for "a trial by jury of not less than
six persons," 25 U.S.C. § 1302(10), but the
tribal court is not explicitly prohibited
from excluding non-Indians from the jury
even where a non-Indian is being tried. In
1977, the Suquamish Tribe amended its
Law and Order Code to provide that only
Suquamish tribal members shall serve as
jurors in tribal court.
Both petitioners are non-Indian residents of the
Port Madison Reservation. Petitioner Mark David
Oliphant was arrested by tribal authorities during
the Suquamish's annual Chief Seattle Days
celebration and charged with assaulting a tribal
officer and resisting arrest. After arraignment
before the tribal court, Oliphant was released on his
own recognizance. Petitioner Daniel B. Belgarde
was arrested by tribal authorities after an alleged
high-speed race along the Reservation highways
that only ended when Belgarde collided with a
tribal police vehicle. Belgarde posted bail and was
released. Six days later he was arraigned and
**1014 charged under the tribal Code with
"recklessly endangering another person" and
injuring tribal property. Tribal court proceedings
against both petitioners have been stayed pending a
decision in this case.
[1] Both petitioners applied for a writ of habeas
corpus to the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington. Petitioners
argued that the Suquamish Indian Provisional Court
does not have criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. In separate proceedings, the District
Court disagreed *195 with petitioners' argument
and denied the petitions. On August 24, 1976, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
denial of habeas corpus in the case of petitioner
Oliphant. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007.
Petitioner Belgarde's appeal is still pending before
the Court of Appeals. [FN5] We granted certiorari,
431 U.S. 964, 97 S.Ct. 2919, 53 L.Ed.2d 1059, to
decide whether Indian tribal courts have criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. We decide that they
do not.

FN5. Belgarde's petition for certiorari was
granted while his appeal was still pending
before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. No further proceedings in that
court have been held pending our decision.
I
[2][3] Respondents do not contend that their
exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
stems from affirmative congressional authorization
or treaty provision. [FN6] Instead, respondents
*196 urge that such jurisdiction flows automatically
from the "Tribe's retained inherent powers of
government over the Port Madison Indian
Reservation." Seizing on language in our opinions
describing Indian tribes as "quasi-sovereign
entities," see, e. g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 554, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 2484, 41 L.Ed.2d 290
(1974), the Court of Appeals agreed and held that
Indian tribes, "though conquered and dependent,
retain those powers of autonomous states that are
neither inconsistent with their status nor expressly
terminated by Congress." According to the Court
of Appeals, criminal jurisdiction over anyone
committing an offense on the reservation is a "sine
qua non" of such powers.
FN6.
Respondents do contend that
Congress has "confirmed" the power of
Indian tribes to try and to punish
non-Indians
through
the
Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 987,
25 U.S.C. § 476, and the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
Neither Act, however, addresses, let alone
"confirms," tribal criminal jurisdiction
over
non-Indians.
The
Indian
Reorganization Act merely gives each
Indian Tribe the right "to organize for its
common welfare" and to "adopt an
appropriate constitution and bylaws."
With certain specific additions not relevant
here, the tribal council is to have such
powers as are vested "by existing law."
The Indian Civil Rights Act merely
extends to "any person" within the tribe's
jurisdiction certain enumerated guarantees
of the Bill of Rights of the Federal
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Constitution.
As respondents note, an early version of
the Indian Civil Rights Act extended its
guarantees only to "American Indians,"
rather than to "any person." The purpose
of the later modification was to extend the
Act's guarantees to "all persons who may
be subject to the jurisdiction of tribal
governments,
whether
Indians
or
non-Indians." Summary Report on the
Constitutional Rights of American Indians,
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1966). But this
change was certainly not intended to give
Indian tribes criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. Nor can it be read to
"confirm" respondents' argument that
Indian tribes have inherent criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. Instead, the
modification
merely
demonstrates
Congress' desire to extend the Act's
guarantees to non-Indians if and where
they come under a tribe's criminal or civil
jurisdiction by either treaty provision or
Act of Congress.
The Suquamish Indian Tribe does not stand alone
today in its assumption of criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. Of the 127 reservation court systems
that currently exercise criminal jurisdiction in the
United States, 33 purport to extend that jurisdiction
to non-Indians. [FN7] Twelve other Indian **1015
tribes have enacted ordinances which would permit
the assumption of criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. Like the Suquamish these tribes claim
authority to try non-Indians not on the basis of
congressional statute or treaty provision but by
reason of their retained national sovereignty.
FN7. Of the 127 courts currently operating
on Indian reservations, 71 (including the
Suquamish Indian Provisional Court) are
tribal courts, established and functioning
pursuant to tribal legislative powers; 30
are "CFR Courts" operating under the
Code of Federal Regulations, 25 CFR §
11.1 et seq. (1977); 16 are traditional

courts of the New Mexico pueblos; and 10
are conservation courts. The CFR Courts
are the offspring of the Courts of Indian
Offenses, first provided for in the Indian
Department Appropriations Act of 1888,
25 Stat. 217, 233. See W. Hagan, Indian
Police and Judges (1966). By regulations
issued in 1935, the jurisdiction of CFR
Courts is restricted to offenses committed
by Indians within the reservation. 25 CFR
§ 11.2(a)(1977). The case before us is
concerned
only with the
criminal
jurisdiction of tribal courts.
The effort by Indian tribal courts to exercise
criminal *197 jurisdiction over non-Indians,
however, is a relatively new phenomenon. And
where the effort has been made in the past, it has
been held that the jurisdiction did not exist. Until
the middle of this century, few Indian tribes
maintained any semblance of a formal court system.
Offenses by one Indian against another were
usually handled by social and religious pressure and
not by formal judicial processes; emphasis was on
restitution rather than on punishment. In 1834 the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs described the then
status of Indian criminal systems: "With the
exception of two or three tribes, who have within a
few years past attempted to establish some few laws
and regulations among themselves, the Indian tribes
are without laws, and the chiefs without much
authority to exercise any restraint." H.R.Rep. No.
474, 23d Cong, 1st Sess, 91 (1834).
[4] It is therefore not surprising to find no specific
discussion of the problem before us in the volumes
of the United States Reports. But the problem did
not lie entirely dormant for two centuries. A few
tribes during the 19th century did have formal
criminal systems. From the earliest treaties with
these tribes, it was apparently assumed that the
tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians absent a congressional statute or treaty
provision to that effect. For example, the 1830
Treaty with the Choctaw Indian Tribe, which had
one of the most sophisticated of tribal structures,
guaranteed to the Tribe "the jurisdiction and
government of all the persons and property that may
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be within their limits." Despite the broad terms of
this governmental guarantee, however, the
Choctaws at the conclusion of this treaty provision
"express a wish that Congress may grant to the
Choctaws the right of punishing by their own laws
any white man who shall come into their nation, and
infringe any of their national regulations." [FN8]
**1016 Art. 4, 7 Stat. 333 (emphasis added). Such
a *198 request for affirmative congressional
authority is inconsistent with respondents' belief
that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is
inherent in tribal sovereignty. Faced by attempts
*199 of the Choctaw Tribe to try non-Indian
offenders in the early 1800's the United States
Attorneys General also concluded that the Choctaws
did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
absent
congressional
authority.
See
2
Op.Atty.Gen. 693 (1834); 7 Op.Atty.Gen. 174
(1855). According to the Attorney General in 1834,
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, is inter
alia, inconsistent with treaty provisions recognizing
the sovereignty of the United States over the
territory assigned to the Indian nation and the
dependence of the Indians on the United States.
FN8. The history of Indian treaties in the
United States is consistent with the
principle that Indian tribes may not assume
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
without the permission of Congress. The
earliest
treaties
typically
expressly
provided that "any citizen of the United
States, who shall do an injury to any Indian
of the [tribal] nation, or to any other Indian
or Indians residing in their towns, and
under their protection, shall be punished
according to the laws of the United States."
See, e. g, Treaty with the Shawnees, Art.
Ill, 7 Stat. 26 (1786). While, as
elaborated further below, these provisions
were not necessary to remove criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians from the
Indian tribes, they would naturally have
served an important function in the
developing stage of United States-Indian
relations by clarifying jurisdictional limits
of the Indian tribes. The same treaties
generally provided that "[i]f any citizen of
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim

V>ffr\*//r%rir»t \x7£»ctlQ\x7 r>nmIAf*]\\7f*r\7

lntm19rl<=»ct=Qtr\/?rform

the United States . . . shall attempt to
settle on any of the lands hereby allotted to
the Indians to live and hunt on, such
person shall forfeit the protection of the
United States of America, and the Indians
may punish him or not as they please."
See, e. g, Treaty with the Choctaws, Art.
IV, 7 Stat. 22 (1786). Far from
representing a recognition of any inherent
Indian
criminal
jurisdiction
over
non-Indians settling on tribal lands, these
provisions were instead intended as a
means
of
discouraging
non-Indian
settlements on Indian territory, in
contravention of treaty provisions to the
contrary. See 5 Annals of Cong. 903-904
(1796). Later treaties dropped this
provision and provided instead that
non-Indian settlers would be removed by
the United States upon complaint being
lodged by the tribe. See, e. g, Treaty with
the Sacs and Foxes, 7 Stat. 84 (1804).
As the relationship between Indian tribes
and the United States developed through
the passage of time, specific provisions for
the punishment of non-Indians by the
United States, rather than by the tribes,
slowly disappeared from the treaties.
Thus, for example, none of the treaties
signed by Washington Indians in the
1850's explicitly proscribed criminal
prosecution and punishment of non-Indians
by the Indian tribes. As discussed below,
however, several of the treaty provisions
can be read as recognizing that criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians would be in
the United States rather than in the tribes.
The disappearance of provisions explicitly
providing
for
the
punishment
of
non-Indians by the United States, rather
than by the Indian tribes, coincides with
and is at least partly explained by the
extension of federal enclave law over
non-Indians in the Trade and Intercourse
Acts and the general recognition by
Attorneys General and lower federal courts
that Indians did not have jurisdiction to try
non-Indians. See infra, at 1016-1017.
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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When it was felt necessary to expressly
spell out respective jurisdictions, later
treaties still provided that criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians would be in
the United States. See, e. g, Treaty with
the Utah-Tabeguache Band, Art. 6, 13
Stat. 674(1863).
Only one treaty signed by the United
States has ever provided for any form of
tribal
criminal
jurisdiction
over
non-Indians
(other
than
in
the
illegal-settler context noted above). The
first treaty signed by the United States with
an Indian tribe, the 1778 Treaty with the
Delawares, provided that neither party to
the treaty could "proceed to the infliction
of punishments on the citizens of the other,
otherwise than by securing the offender or
offenders by imprisonment, or any other
competent means, till a fair and impartial
trial can be had by judges or juries of both
parties, as near as can be to the laws,
customs and usages of the contracting
parties and natural justice: The mode of
such tryals to be hereafter fixed by the
wise men of the United States in Congress
assembled, with the assistance of . . .
deputies of the Delaware nation . . . ."
Treaty with the Delawares, Art. IV, 7 Stat.
14 (emphasis added). While providing for
Delaware participation in the trial of
non-Indians, this treaty section established
that non-Indians could only be tried under
the auspices of the United States and in a
manner fixed by the Continental Congress.
At least one court has previously considered the
power of Indian courts to try non-Indians and it also
held against jurisdiction. [FN9] In Ex parte Kenyon
, 14 Fed.Cas. page 353, No. 7,720 *200
W.D.Ark.1878), Judge Isaac C. Parker, who as
District Court Judge for the Western District of
Arkansas was constantly exposed to the legal
relationships between Indians and non-Indians,
[FN10] held that to give an Indian tribal **1017
court "jurisdiction of the person of an offender,
such offender must be an Indian." Id, at 355. The
conclusion of Judge Parker was reaffirmed *201

only recently in a 1970 opinion of the Solicitor of
the Department of the Interior. See Criminal
Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes over Non-Indians, 11
LD. 113. [FN11]
FN9. According to Felix
Cohen's
Handbook of Federal Indian Law 148
(U.S. Dept. of the Interior 1941) "attempts
of tribes to exercise jurisdiction over
non-Indians . . . have been generally
condemned by the federal courts since the
end of the treaty-making period, and the
writ of habeas corpus has been used to
discharge white defendants from tribal
custody."
FN 10. Judge Parker sat as the judge of the
United States District Court for the
Western District of Arkansas from 1875
until 1896. By reason of the laws of
Congress in effect at the time, that
particular court not only handled the
normal docket of federal cases arising in
the Western District of Arkansas, but also
had criminal jurisdiction over what was
then called the "Indian Territory." This
area varied in size during Parker's tenure;
at one time it extended as far west as the
eastern border of Colorado, and always
included substantial parts of what would
later become the State of Oklahoma. In
the exercise of this jurisdiction over the
Indian Territory, the Court in which he sat
was necessarily in constant contact with
individual Indians, the tribes of which they
were members, and the white men who
dealt with them and often preyed upon
them.
Judge Parker's views of the law were not
always upheld by this Court. See 2 J.
Wigmore, Evidence § 276, pp. 115-116, n.
3 (3d ed. 1940). A reading of Wigmore,
however, indicates that he was as critical
of the decisions of this Court there
mentioned as this Court was of the
evidentiary rulings of Judge Parker.
Nothing in these long forgotten disputes
detracts from the universal esteem in
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which the Indian tribes which were subject
to the jurisdiction of his court held Judge
Parker. One of his biographers, describing
the judge's funeral, states that after the
grave was filled "[t]he principal chief of
the Choctaws, Pleasant Porter, came
forward and placed a wreath of wild
flowers on the grave." H. Croy, He Hanged
Them High 222 (1952).
It may be that Judge Parker's views as to
the ultimate destiny of the Indian people
are not in accord with current thinking on
the subject, but we have observed in more
than one of our cases that the views of the
people on this issue as reflected in the
judgments of Congress itself have changed
from one era to the next. See Kake
Village v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 71- 74, 82
S.Ct. 562, 568-570, 7 L.Ed.2d 573 (1962).
There cannot be the slightest doubt that
Judge Parker was, by his own lights and by
the lights of the time in which he lived, a
judge who was thoroughly acquainted with
and sympathetic to the Indians and Indian
tribes which were subject to the
jurisdiction of his court, as well as familiar
with the law which governed them. See
generally Hell on the Border (1971, J.
Gregory & R. Strickland, eds.).
FN11. The 1970 opinion of the Solicitor
was withdrawn in 1974 but has not been
replaced. No reason was given for the
withdrawal.
While Congress was concerned almost from its
beginning with the special problems of law
enforcement on the Indian reservations, it did not
initially address itself to the problem of tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. For the reasons
previously stated, there was little reason to be
concerned with assertions of tribal court jurisdiction
over non-Indians because of the absence of formal
tribal judicial systems. Instead, Congress' concern
was with providing effective protection for the
Indians "from the violences of the lawless part of
our frontier inhabitants." Seventh Annual Address
of President George Washington, 1 Messages and

Papers of the Presidents, 1789- 1897, pp. 181, 185
(J. Richardson, ed., 1897). Without such
protection, it was felt that "all the exertions of the
Government to prevent destructive retaliations by
the Indians will prove fruitless and all our present
agreeable prospects illusory." Ibid Beginning with
the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 137,
therefore, Congress assumed federal jurisdiction
over offenses by non-Indians against Indians which
"would be punishable by the laws of [the] state or
district . . . if the offense had been committed
against a citizen or white inhabitant thereof." In
1817, Congress went one step further and extended
federal enclave law to the Indian country; the only
exception was for "any offence committed by one
Indian against another." 3 Stat. 383, now codified,
as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
It was in 1834 that Congress was first directly
faced with the prospect of Indians trying
non-Indians. In the Western Territory bill, [FN 12]
Congress proposed to create an Indian territory
beyond the western-directed destination of the
settlers; *202 the territory was to be governed by a
confederation of Indian tribes and was expected
ultimately to become a State of the Union. While
the bill would have created a political territory with
broad governing powers, Congress was careful not
to give the tribes of the territory criminal
jurisdiction over United States officials and citizens
traveling through the area. [FN 13] The reasons
were quite practical:
FN12. See H.R.Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong.,
lstSess.,36(1834).
FN13. The Western Territory bill, like the
early Indian treaties, see n. 6, supra, did
not extend the protection of the United
States to non-Indians who settled without
Government business in Indian territory.
See Western Territory bill, § 6, in
H.R.Rep. No. 474, supra, at 35; id, at 18.
This exception, like that in the early
treaties, was presumably meant to
discourage settlement on land that was
reserved exclusively for the use of the
various Indian tribes. Today, many
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reservations, including the Port Madison
Reservation, have extensive non-Indian
populations.
The
percentage
of
non-Indian residents grew as a direct and
intended result of congressional policies in
the late 19th and early 20th centuries
promoting the assimilation of the Indians
into the non-Indian culture. Respondents
point to no statute, in comparison to the
Western Territory bill, where Congress has
intended to give Indian tribes jurisdiction
today over non-Indians residing within
reservations. Even as drafted, many
Congressmen felt that the bill was too
radical a shift in United States-Indian
relations and the bill was tabled. See 10
Cong.Deb. 4779 (1834). While the
Western Territory bill was resubmitted
several times in revised form, it was never
passed. See generally R. Gittinger, The
Formation of the State of Oklahoma
(1939).
**1018 "Officers, and persons in the service of
the United States, and persons required to
reside in the Indian country by treaty
stipulations, must necessarily be placed under
the protection, and subject to the laws of the
United States. To persons merely travelling in
the Indian country the same protection is
extended. The want of fixed laws, of
competent tribunals of justice, which must for
some time continue in the Indian country,
absolutely requires for the peace of both sides
that this protection should be extended."
H.R.Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess., 18
(1834).
*203 Congress' concern over criminal jurisdiction
in this proposed Indian Territory contrasts markedly
with its total failure to address criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians on other reservations, which
frequently bordered non-Indian settlements. The
contrast suggests that Congress shared the view of
the Executive Branch and lower federal courts that
Indian tribal courts were without jurisdiction to try
non-Indians.
[5] This unspoken assumption was also evident in

other congressional actions during the 19th century.
In 1854, for example, Congress amended the
Trade and Intercourse Act to proscribe the
prosecution in federal court of an Indian who has
already been tried in tribal court. § 3, 10 Stat. 270,
now codified, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1152. No
similar provision, such as would have been required
by parallel logic if tribal courts had jurisdiction
over non-Indians, was enacted barring retrial of
non-Indians. Similarly, in the Major Crimes Act of
1885, Congress placed under the jurisdiction of
federal courts Indian offenders who commit certain
specified major offenses. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, § 9,
23 Stat. 385, now codified, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §
1153. If tribal courts may try non-Indians,
however, as respondents contend, those tribal courts
are free to try non-Indians even for such major
offenses as Congress may well have given the
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to try members
of their own tribe committing the exact same
offenses. [FN 14]
FN 14. The Major Crimes Act provides that
Indians committing any of the enumerated
offenses "shall be subject to the same laws
and penalties as all other persons
committing any of the above offenses,
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States." (Emphasis added.) While
the question has never been directly
addressed by this Court, Courts of Appeals
have read this language to exclude tribal
jurisdiction over the Indian offender. See,
e. g„ Sam v. United States, 385 F.2d 213,
214 (CA10 1967); Felicia v. United States
, 495 F.2d 353, 354 (CA8 1974). We have
no reason to decide today whether
jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act is
exclusive.
The legislative history of the original
version of the Major Crimes Act, which
was introduced as a House amendment to
the Indian Appropriation Act of 1855,
creates some confusion on the question of
exclusive jurisdiction.
As
originally
worded, the amendment would have
provided for trial in the United States
courts "and not otherwise" Apparently at
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the suggestion of Congressman Budd, who
believed that concurrent jurisdiction in the
courts of the United States was sufficient,
the words "and not otherwise" were
deleted when the amendment was later
reintroduced. See 16 Cong.Rec. 934-935
(1885). However, as finally accepted by
the Senate and passed by both Houses, the
amendment did provide that the Indian
offender would be punished as any other
offender, "within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States." The issue of
exclusive jurisdiction over major crimes
was mooted for all practical purposes by
the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968 which limits the punishment that
can be imposed by Indian tribal courts to a
term of 6 months or a fine of $500.
*204 In 1891, this Court recognized that Congress1
various actions and inactions in regulating criminal
jurisdiction on Indian reservations demonstrated an
intent to reserve jurisdiction over non-Indians for
the federal courts. In In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107,
115-116, 11 S.Ct. 939, 941, 35 L.Ed. 635 (1891),
the Court noted that the policy of Congress had
been to allow the inhabitants of the Indian country
"such power of self-government as was thought to
be consistent with the safety of the white population
with which they may have come in contact, and to
encourage them as far as possible in **1019 raising
themselves to our standard of civilization." The
"general object" of the congressional statutes was to
allow Indian nations criminal "jurisdiction of all
controversies between Indians, or where a member
of the nation is the only party to the proceeding, and
to reserve to the courts of the United States
jurisdiction of all actions to which its own citizens
are parties on either side." Ibid While Congress
never expressly forbade Indian tribes to impose
criminal penalties on non-Indians, we now make
express our implicit conclusion of nearly a century
ago that Congress consistently believed this to be
the necessary result of its repeated legislative
actions.
In a 1960 Senate Report, that body expressly
confirmed its *205 assumption that Indian tribal

courts are without inherent jurisdiction to try
non-Indians, and must depend on the Federal
Government for protection from intruders. [FN 15]
In considering a statute that would prohibit
unauthorized entry upon Indian land for the purpose
of hunting or fishing, the Senate Report noted:
FN15. In 1977, a congressional Policy
Review Commission, citing the lower court
decisions in Oliphant and Belgarde,
concluded that "[tjhere is an established
legal basis for tribes to exercise
jurisdiction over non-Indians." 1 Final
Report of the American Indian Policy
Review Commission 114, 117, 152-154
(1977). However,
the
Commission's
report does not deny that for almost 200
years before the lower courts decided
Oliphant and Belgarde, the three branches
of the Federal Government were in
apparent agreement that Indian tribes do
not have jurisdiction over non-Indians. As
the Vice Chairman of the Commission,
Congressman Lloyd Meeds, noted in
dissent, "such jurisdiction has generally
not been asserted and . . . the lack of
legislation on this point reflects a
congressional assumption that there was no
such tribal jurisdiction." Final Report,
supra, at 587.
"The problem confronting Indian tribes with
sizable reservations is that the United States
provides no protection against trespassers
comparable to the protection it gives to Federal
property as exemplified by title 18, United
States Code, section 1863 [trespass on national
forest lands]. Indian property owners should
have the same protection as other property
owners. For example, a private hunting club
may keep nonmembers off its game lands or it
may issue a permit for a fee. One who comes
on such lands without permission may be
prosecuted under State law but a non-Indian
trespasser on an Indian reservation enjoys
immunity. This is by reason of the fact that
Indian tribal law is enforcible against Indians
only; not against non-Indians.
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** *
"Non-Indians are not subject to the jurisdiction
of Indian courts and cannot be tried in Indian
courts on trespass *206 charges. Further,
there are no Federal laws which can be invoked
against trespassers.
"The committee has considered this bill and
believes that the legislation is meritorious.
The legislation will give to the Indian tribes
and to individual Indian owners certain rights
that now exist as to others, and fills a gap in the
present law for the protection of their
property." S.Rep. No. 1686, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess., 2-3 (1960) (emphasis added).
II
[6] While not conclusive on the issue before us,
the commonly shared presumption of Congress, the
Executive Branch, and lower federal courts that
tribal courts do not have the power to try
non-Indians carries considerable weight. Cf.
Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 245-247, 17
S.Ct 107, 108-109, 41 L.Ed. 419 (1896); Morris v.
Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384, 391-393, 24 S.Ct. 712,
715, 48 L.Ed. 1030 (1904); Warren Trading Post
Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 690, 85
S.Ct. 1242, 1245, 14 L.Ed.2d 165 (1965);
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425,
444-445, 95 s.Ct. 1082, 1092-1093, 43 L.Ed.2d
300 (1965). "Indian law" draws principally upon
the treaties drawn and executed by the Executive
Branch and legislation passed by Congress. These
instruments, which beyond their actual text form the
backdrop **1020 for the intricate web of judicially
made Indian law, cannot be interpreted in isolation
but must be read in light of the common notions of
the day and the assumptions of those who drafted
them. Ibid.
[7] While in isolation the Treaty of Point Elliott,
12 Stat. 927 (1855), would appear to be silent as to
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, the
addition of historical perspective casts substantial
doubt upon the existence of such jurisdiction.
[FN 16] In the Ninth Article, for example, the
Suquamish *207 "acknowledge their dependence on
© 2005 Thomson/West. No

http://print.westlaw.comM^

the government of the United States." As Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall explained in Worcester v.
Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 551-552, 554, 8 L.Ed. 483
(1832), such an acknowledgment is not a mere
abstract recognition of the United States'
sovereignty. "The Indian nations were, from their
situation, necessarily dependent on [the United
States] . . . for their protection from lawless and
injurious intrusions into their country." Id, at 555.
By acknowledging their dependence on the United
States, in the Treaty of Point Elliott, the Suquamish
were in all probability recognizing that the United
States would arrest and try non-Indian intruders
who came within their Reservation. Other
provisions *208 of the Treaty also point to the
absence of tribal jurisdiction. Thus the Tribe
"agree [s] not to shelter or conceal offenders against
the laws of the United States, but to deliver them up
to the authorities for trial." Read in conjunction
with 18 U.S.C. § 1152, which extends federal
enclave law to non-Indian offenses on Indian
reservations, this provision implies that the
Suquamish are to promptly deliver up any
non-Indian offender, rather than try and punish him
themselves. [FN17]
FN 16. When treaties with the Washington
Tribes were first contemplated, the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs sent
instructions to the Commission to Hold
Treaties with the Indian Tribes in
Washington Territory and in the Blackfoot
Country. Included with the instructions
were copies of treaties previously
negotiated with the Omaha Indians, 10
Stat. 1043 (1854), and with the Ottoe and
Missouria Indians, 10 Stat. 1038 (1854),
which the Commissioner "regarded as
exhibiting provisions proper on the part of
the Government and advantages to the
Indians" and which he felt would "afford
valuable
suggestions."
The
criminal
provisions of the Treaty of Point Elliott are
clearly patterned after the criminal
provisions in these "exemplary" treaties, in
most respects copying the provisions
verbatim. Like the Treaty of Point Elliott,
the treaties with the Omahas and with the
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Ottoes and Missourias did not specifically
address the issue of tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Sometime after the receipt of these
instructions,
the
Washington
treaty
Commission itself prepared and discussed
a draft treaty which specifically provided
that M[i]njuries committed by whites
towards them [are] not to be revenged, but
on complaint being made they shall be
tried by the Laws of the United States and
if convicted the offenders punished." For
some unexplained reason, however, in
negotiating a treaty with the Indians, the
Commission went back to the language
used in the two "exemplary" treaties sent
by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
Although respondents contend that the
Commission returned to the original
language because of tribal opposition to
relinquishment of criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians, there is no evidence to
support this view of the matter. Instead, it
seems probable that the Commission
preferred to use the language that had been
recommended by the Office of Indian
Affairs. As discussed below, the language
ultimately used, wherein the Tribe
acknowledged its dependence on the
United States and promised to be "friendly
with all citizens thereof," could well have
been
understood
as
acknowledging
exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians.
FN 17. In interpreting Indian treaties and
statutes, " '[djoubtfiil expressions are to be
resolved in favor of the weak and
defenseless people who are the wards of
the nation, dependent upon its protection
and good faith.1 " McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174, 93
S.Ct. 1257, 1263, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973),
see Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737, 760, 18
L.Ed. 667 (1866); United States v. Nice,
241 U.S. 591, 599, 36 S.Ct. 696, 698, 60
L.Ed. 1192 (1916). But treaty and
statutory provisions which are not clear on
© 2005 Thomson/West. No

their face may "be clear from the
surrounding circumstances and legislative
history." Cf. DeCoteau v. District County
Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444, 95 S.Ct. 1082,
1092, 43 L.Ed.2d 300 (1975).
By themselves, these treaty provisions would
probably not be sufficient to remove criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians if the Tribe otherwise
retained such jurisdiction. But an examination of
our earlier precedents satisfies us that, even
ignoring
treaty
**1021
provisions
and
congressional policy, Indians do not have criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirmative
delegation of such power by Congress. Indian
tribes do retain elements of "quasi-sovereign"
authority after ceding their lands to the United
States and announcing their dependence on the
Federal Government. See Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 15, 8 L.Ed. 25 (1831). But the
tribes' retained powers are not such that they are
limited only by specific restrictions in treaties or
congressional enactments. As the Court of Appeals
recognized Indian tribes are prohibited from
exercising both those powers of autonomous states
that are expressly terminated by Congress and those
powers "inconsistent with their status." Oliphant v.
Schlie, 544 F.2d, at 1009 (emphasis added).
Indian reservations are "a part of the territory of
the United *209 States." United States v. Rogers, 4
How. 567, 571, 11 L.Ed. 1105 (1846). Indian
tribes "hold and occupy [the reservations] with the
assent of the United States, and under their
authority." Id, at 572. Upon incorporation into
the territory of the United States, the Indian tribes
thereby come under the territorial sovereignty of the
United States and their exercise of separate power is
constrained so as not to conflict with the interests of
this overriding sovereignty. "[T]heir rights to
complete sovereignty, as independent nations, [are]
necessarily diminished." Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8
Wheat. 543, 574, 5 L.Ed. 681 (1823).
We have already described some of the inherent
limitations on tribal powers that stem from their
incorporation into the United States. In Johnson v.
M'Intosh, supra, we noted that the Indian tribes'
L to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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"power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to
whomsoever they pleased," was inherently lost to
the overriding sovereignty of the United States.
And in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, supra, the
Chief Justice observed that since Indian tribes are
"completely under the sovereignty and dominion of
the United States, . . . any attempt [by foreign
nations] to acquire their lands, or to form a political
connexion with them, would be considered by all as
an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility."
5 Pet, at 17-18.
[8] Nor are the intrinsic limitations on Indian tribal
authority restricted to limitations on the tribes'
power to transfer lands or exercise external political
sovereignty. In the first case to reach this Court
dealing with the status of Indian tribes, Mr. Justice
Johnson in a separate concurrence summarized the
nature of the limitations inherently flowing from the
overriding sovereignty of the United States as
follows: "[T]he restrictions upon the right of soil in
the Indians, amount . . . to an exclusion of all
competitors [to the United States] from their
markets; and the limitation upon their sovereignty
amounts to the right of governing every person
within their limits except themselves." Fletcher v.
Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 147, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810)
(emphasis added). Protection of territory within its
*210 external political boundaries is, of course, as
central to the sovereign interests of the United
States as it is to any other sovereign nation. But
from the formation of the Union and the adoption of
the Bill of Rights, the United States has manifested
an equally great solicitude that its citizens be
protected by the United States from unwarranted
intrusions on their personal liberty. The power of
the United States to try and criminally punish is an
important manifestation of the power to restrict
personal liberty. By submitting to the overriding
sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes
therefore necessarily give up their power to try
non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a
manner acceptable to Congress. This principle
would have been obvious a century ago when most
Indian tribes were characterized by a "want of fixed
laws [and] of competent tribunals of justice."
H.R.Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong, 1st Sess, 18 (1834).
It should be no less obvious today, even though
© 2005 Thomson/West. No

present-day Indian tribal courts embody dramatic
advances over their historical antecedents.
**1022 In Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 3
S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883), the Court was
faced with almost the inverse of the issue before us
here—whether, prior to the passage of the Major
Crimes Act, federal courts had jurisdiction to try
Indians who had offended against fellow Indians on
reservation land. In concluding that criminal
jurisdiction was exclusively in the tribe, it found
particular guidance in the "nature and circumstances
of the case." The United States was seeking to
extend United States
"law, by argument and inference only, . . . over
aliens and strangers; over the members of a
community separated by race [and] tradition, . . .
from the authority and power which seeks to
impose upon them the restraints of an external
and unknown code . . .; which judges them by a
standard made by others and not for them . . . . It
tries them, not by their peers, nor by the customs
of *211 their people, nor the law of their land, but
by . . . a different race, according to the law of a
social state of which they have an imperfect
conception
" Id, at 571, 3 S.Ct, at 406.
These considerations, applied here to the
non-Indian rather than Indian offender, speak
equally strongly against the validity of respondents'
contention that Indian tribes, although fully
subordinated to the sovereignty of the United
States, retain the power to try non-Indians
according to their own customs and procedure.
As previously noted, Congress extended the
jurisdiction of federal courts, in the Trade and
Intercourse Act of 1790, to offenses committed by
non-Indians against Indians within Indian Country.
In doing so, Congress was careful to extend to the
non-Indian offender the basic criminal rights that
would attach in non-Indian related cases. Under
respondents' theory, however, Indian tribes would
have been free to try the same non-Indians without
these careful
proceedings unless
Congress
affirmatively legislated to the contrary. Such an
exercise of jurisdiction over non-Indian citizens of
the United States would belie the tribes' forfeiture
of full sovereignty in return for the protection of the
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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United States.

consideration or decision of this case.

In summary, respondents' position ignores that
"Indians are within the geographical limits of the
United States. The soil and people within these
limits are under the political control of the
Government of the United States, or of the States
of the Union. There exists in the broad domain
of sovereignty but these two. There may be
cities, counties, and other organized bodies with
limited legislative functions, but they . . . exist in
subordination to one or the other of these."
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379, 6
S.Ct. 1109, 1111, 30 L.Ed. 228 (1886).
We recognize that some Indian tribal court
systems have become increasingly sophisticated and
resemble in many *212 respects their state
counterparts. We also acknowledge that with the
passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,
which extends certain basic procedural rights to
anyone tried in Indian tribal court, many of the
dangers that might have accompanied the exercise
by tribal courts of criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians only a few decades ago have
disappeared. Finally, we are not unaware of the
prevalence of non-Indian crime on today's
reservations which the tribes forcefully argue
requires the ability to try non-Indians. [FN 18] But
these are considerations for Congress to weigh in
deciding whether Indian tribes should finally be
authorized to try non-Indians. They have little
relevance to the principles which lead us to
conclude that Indian tribes do not have inherent
**1023 jurisdiction to try and to punish
non-Indians. The judgments below are therefore

Mr. Justice MARSHALL, with
CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting.

FN18. See 4 National American Indian
Court Judges Assn., Justice and the
American Indian 51-52 (1974); Hearings
on S. 1 and S. 1400 (reform of the Federal
Criminal Laws) before the Subcommittee
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., 6469 etseq. (1973).

whom

THE

I agree with the court below that the "power to
preserve order on the reservation . . . is a sine qua
non of the sovereignty that the Suquamish originally
possessed." Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007,
1009 (CA9 1976). In the absence of affirmative
withdrawal by treaty or statute, I am of the view that
Indian tribes enjoy as a necessary aspect of their
retained sovereignty the right to try and punish all
persons who commit offenses against tribal law
within the reservation. Accordingly, I dissent.
435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209
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Supreme Court of the United States
Paul SEYMOUR, Petitioner,
v.
SUPERINTENDENT OF WASHINGTON STATE
PENITENTIARY.
No. 62.
Argued Dec. 13, 1961.
Decided Jan. 15, 1962.
Habeas corpus proceeding by an enrolled,
unemancipated member of the Colville Indian Tribe
who had been convicted in a state court of offense
of attempted burglary. The Supreme Court of
Washington, 55 Wash.2d 109, 346 P.2d 669, denied
the petition, and Indian was granted certiorari. The
Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Black, held that Act of
1906 providing for sale of mineral lands and for
settlement and entry under homestead laws of other
surplus land remaining on diminished Colville
Indian Reservation, did not dissolve such
reservation, but the reservation remains in
existence, and state therefore did not have
jurisdiction over the offense which was committed
on such reservation.

209k38(2) Most Cited Cases
Question of whether place where a crime committed
by an unemancipated member of an Indian tribe was
part of an Indian reservation and therefore Indian
country within statute defining Indian country for
purposes of exclusive jurisdiction, depended upon
interpretation and application of federal law. 18
U.S.C.A. §§1151, 1153.
[3] Indians €=^16.10(1)
209kl6.10(l) Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 209k32)
Purpose of 1906 Act providing for sale of mineral
lands and for settlement and entry under homestead
laws of other surplus lands remaining on diminished
Colville Indian Reservation was neither to destroy
existence of the diminished reservation nor to lessen
federal responsibility for and jurisdiction over
Indians having tribal rights on that reservation, and
such act did no more than open way for non-Indian
settlers to own land on the reservation in a manner
which federal government regarded as beneficial to
development of its wards. Act March 22, 1906, §§ 1
et seq., 2, 3, 6, 12, 34 Stat. 80-82.
[4] Indians €=>12
209kl2 Most Cited Cases

Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes
[1] Federal Courts € ^ 5 0 6
170Bk506 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 106k397)
Certiorari would be granted from a state's denial of
habeas corpus to an Indian prisoner, where question
of whether place where crime occurred was Indian
country depended upon application of federal law,
and resolution of that question raised issues of
importance pertaining to relationship of the United
States to its Indian wards. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153.

[4] Indians €=^38(2)
209k38(2) Most Cited Cases
Act of 1906 providing for sale of mineral lands and
for settlement and entry under homestead laws of
other surplus land remaining on diminished Colville
Indian Reservation did not dissolve such
reservation, but the reservation remains in existence
and therefore state of Washington did not have
jurisdiction over offense of burglary committed on
such reservation by an enrolled, unemancipated
member of the Colville Indian Tribe. Act March
22, 1906, §§ 1 et seq., 2, 3, 6, 12, 34 Stat. 80-82.
[5] Indians €==>36
209k36 Most Cited Cases

[2] Indians €=^38(2)
© 2005 Thomson/West. No
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A burglary offense committed on land within limits
of an Indian reservation was committed within
"Indian country", within exclusive jurisdiction
statute, even if the particular parcel of land upon
which the offense was committed was held under a
patent in fee by a non-Indian. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151
, 1153.
[6] Indians €=^32(1)
209k32(l) Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 209k32)
Words "notwithstanding issuance of any patent",
within definition of Indian country as including all
land within limits of any Indian reservation under
jurisdiction
of
the
federal
government,
notwithstanding issuance of any patent, means that
patented lands should not be excluded from an
Indian reservation regardless of whether the patents
are issued to Indians or non-Indians. 18 U.S.C.A. §
§ 1151, 1153.
[7] Indians €^>36
209k36 Most Cited Cases
Fact that land on which an attempted burglary was
committed by an Indian was located within a town
laid out by the federal government, within limits of
an Indian reservation, and that such town-site plot
was filed for record in county of a state, did not
mean that such territory was not Indian country,
within statute defining Indian country for purposes
of exclusive jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151,
1153.
[8] Indians €=^12
209k 12 Most Cited Cases
When Congress has once established an Indian
reservation, all tracts included within it remain a
part of the reservation until separated therefrom by
Congress.
[9] Indians €^38(2)
209k38(2) Most Cited Cases
Courts of the state of Washington had no
jurisdiction to try an enrolled, unemancipated
member of the Colville Indian Tribe for burglary,
where land upon which burglary allegedly occurred
was located within limits of the Colville Indian
Reservation. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151, 1153.
© 2005 Thomson/West. No

**425 *351 Glen A. Wilkinson, Washington, D.C.,
for petitioner. Claron C. Spencer was with him on
the briefs.
*352 Stephen C. Way, Olympia, Wash.,
respondent.

for

Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The petitioner Paul Seymour was charged with
burglary b> the State of Washington in the Superior
Court of Okanogan County and pleaded guilty to
the lesser included offense of attempted burglary.
Upon this plea he was convicted and sentenced to
serve seven and one-half years in the state
penitentiary. Later, he commenced this proceeding
by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
State Supreme Court urging that his state conviction
was void for want of jurisdiction on the grounds
that he was an enrolled, unemancipated member of
the Colville Indian Tribe and therefore a ward of
the United States; that the 'purported crime' of
burglary for which he had been convicted was
committed in 'Indian country' as defined in 18
U.S.C. s 1151, 18 U.S.C.A. s 1151; [FN1] and that
burglary committed by an Indian in Indian country
is an offense 'within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States' under 18 U.S.C. s 1153, 18 U.S.C.A.
s 1153. [FN2] Since the petition, return and answer
raised issues of fact, the State Supreme Court
referred the matter to the original trial court to
determine (1) whether petitioner was a member of
the Colville Tribe, and (2) whether the offense was
*353 committed in Indian country. After hearings,
the trial court upheld petitioner's claim of **426
membership in the Colville Tribe, but rejected his
contention that the burglary upon which the state
conviction was based had occurred in Indian
country.
FN1. 62 Stat. 757, as amended, 63 Stat. 94.
FN2. 'Any Indian who commits against the
person or property of another Indian or
other person any of the following offenses,
namely, murder, manslaughter, rape,
incest, assault with intent to kill, assault
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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with a dangerous weapon, arson, burglary,
robbery, and larceny within the Indian
country, shall be subject to the same laws
and penalties as all other persons
committing any of the above offenses,
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States.' 62 Stat. 758.
The trial court's conclusion that the crime did not
take place in Indian country was not based upon any
factual doubt as to the precise place where the
burglary occurred for that fact was undisputed. Nor
did that conclusion rest upon any uncertainty as to
the proper definition of the term 'Indian country' for
the court expressly recognized the applicability of s
1151 which defines the term to include 'all land
within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government,
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the
reservation * * *.' Rather, the trial court's
conclusion rested solely upon its holding that,
although the land upon which the burglary occurred
had once been within the limits of an Indian
reservation, that reservation had since been
dissolved and the land in question restored to the
public domain.
[1][2] Agreeing with the trial court, the State
Supreme Court then denied the petition for habeas
corpus, [FN3] holding as it previously had in State
ex rel. Best v. Superior Court, [FN4] that 'What is
still known as the south half of the diminished
Colville Indian reservation is no longer an Indian
reservation.' Since the question of whether the
place where the crime occurred is a part of an
Indian reservation and therefore Indian country
within the meaning of ss 1151 and 1153 depends
upon the interpretation and application of federal
law, and since the resolution of that question as
presented in this case raises issues of importance
pertaining *354 to this country's relationship to its
Indian wards, we granted certiorari. [FN5]
FN3. Seymour v. Schneckloth, 55 Wash.2d
109, 346P.2d669.
FN4. 107 Wash. 238, 241, 181 P. 688, 689.
© 2005 Thomson/West. No
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FN5. 365 U.S. 833, 81 S.Ct. 749, 5
L.Ed.2d743.
The case turns upon the current status of the
Colville Indian Reservation~a reservation created
in 1872 by Executive Order of President Grant
which declared that 'the country bounded on the
east and south by the Columbia River, on the west
by the Okanagan River, and on the north by the
British possessions, be, and the same is hereby, set
apart as a reservation for' the Colville Indians. [FN6]
In 1892, the size of this reservation was
diminished when Congress passed an Act providing
that, subject to reservations and allotments made to
individual Colville Indians, about one-half of the
original Colville reservation, since commonly
referred to as the 'North Half,' should be 'vacated
and restored to the public domain * * *.' [FN7] This
Act did not, however, purport to affect the status of
the remaining part of the reservation, since known
as the 'South Half or the 'diminished Colville Indian
Reservation,' but instead expressly reaffirmed that
this South Half was 'still reserved by the
Government for their (the Colville Indians') use and
occupancy.' [FN8] Since the burglary of which
petitioner was convicted occurred on land within
the South Half, it is clear that state jurisdiction over
the offense charged, if it is to be found at all, must
be based upon some federal action subsequent to
the 1892 Act.
FN6. I Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and
Treaties (2d ed.), p. 916.
FN7. 27 Stat. 62, 63.
FN8. 27 Stat, at page 64.
The Washington courts found authority for the
assertion of state jurisdiction in a 1906 Act of
Congress [FN9] implemented by a 1916
Presidential Proclamation. [FN 10] The 1906 Act
provided for the sale of mineral lands and *355 for
the settlement and entry under the homestead laws
of other **427 surplus lands remaining on the
diminished Colville Reservation after allotments
were first made and patents issued for 80 acres of
land to 'each man, woman, and child' either
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

T?XV^~+~:^- A

^rronn

82 S.Ct. 424

Page 4

368 U.S. 351, 82 S.Ct. 424, 7 L.Ed.2d 346
(Cite as: 368 U.S. 351, 82 S.Ct. 424)
'belonging to or having tribal relations on said
Colville Indian Reservation * * *.' The 1916
Presidential Proclamation issued pursuant to this
Act simply prescribed the method for disposal of
surplus lands under the homestead laws as the 1906
Act had authorized. The Washington courts viewed
this 1906 Act and the 1916 Presidential
Proclamation as completely wiping out the South
Half of the Colville Reservation in precisely the
same manner as the 1892 Act had Vacated and
restored' the North Half of the reservation 'to the
public domain.' Upon careful consideration,
however, we cannot agree with that conclusion for it
has no support in the language of the 1906 Act and
ignores important differences between that Act and
the provisions of the 1892 Act restoring the North
Half of the reservation to the public domain.
FN9. 34 Stat. 80.
FN10.39Stat. 1778.
[3] Nowhere in the 1906 Act is there to be found
any language similar to that in the 1892 Act
expressly vacating the South Half of the reservation
and restoring that land to the public domain. Quite
the contrary, the 1906 Act repeatedly refers to the
Colville Reservation in a manner that makes it clear
that the intention of Congress was that the
reservation should continue to exist as such. [FN11]
Moreover, the 1906 Act, unlike the 1892 Act,
provides that the proceeds from the disposition of
lands affected by its provisions shall be 'deposited
in the Treasury of the United States to the credit of
the Colville and confederated tribes of Indians
belonging and having tribal rights on the Colville
Indian Reservation, in the State of Washington * *
*.' The 1892 Act had provided for congressional
power to appropriate the net proceeds *356 from
the sale and disposition of lands in the North Half
of the original reservation for the general public
use. Consequently, it seems clear that the purpose
of the 1906 Act was neither to destroy the existence
of the diminished Colville Indian Reservation nor to
lessen federal responsibility for and jurisdiction
over the Indians having tribal rights on that
reservation. The Act did no more than open the way
for non-Indian settlers to own land on the
© 2005 Thomson/West. No

reservation in a manner which the Federal
Government, acting as guardian and trustee for the
Indians, regarded as beneficial to the development
of its wards.
FN11. See ss 2, 3, 6 and 12, 34 Stat, at
pages 80-82.
[4] That this is the proper construction of the 1906
Act finds support in subsequent congressional
treatment of the reservation. Time and time again in
statutes enacted since 1906, Congress has explicitly
recognized the continued existence as a federal
Indian reservation of this South Half or diminished
Colville Indian Reservation. [FN 12] As recently as
1956, Congress enacted a statute which provides
that 'the undisposed-of lands of the Colville Indian
Reservation, Washington, dealt with by the Act of
March 22, 1906 (34 Stat. 80), are hereby restored to
tribal ownership to be held in trust by the United
States to the same extent as all other tribal lands on
the existing reservation, subject to any existing
valid rights.' [FN13] *357 (Emphasis supplied.)
**428 This same construction of the 1906 Act has
been adopted by the Department of Interior, the
agency of government having primary responsibility
for Indian affairs. [FN 14] And the Solicitor
General has urged this construction upon the Court
in this very case. We therefore conclude that the
Washington courts erred in holding that the 1906
Act dissolved the Colville Indian Reservation
because it seems clear that this reservation is still in
existence.
FN12. See, e.g., 39 Stat. 123, 154-155; 39
Stat. 672; 40 Stat. 449; 41 Stat. 535; 43
Stat. 21; 54 Stat. 703, 16 U.S.C.A. s 835d
et seq.; 69 Stat. 141, 143; 70 Stat.
626-627. Two of these statutes, 40 Stat.
449 passed in 1918 and 41 Stat. 535
passed in 1920, do illustrate that there may
have been some congressional confusion
on this issue during that short period of
time for they referred to the 'former
Colville Indian Reservation, Washington.'
FN13. 70 Stat. 626-627. It is also
significant that s 5 of this 1956 Act, while
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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recognizing the continued existence of the
Colville Reservation contained a provision
looking towards 'the termination of Federal
supervision over the property and affairs of
the Confederated
Tribes and their
members * * *' within a reasonable time.
This Act followed closely a 1953 Act, 67
Stat. 588, 590, s 7 of which, 28 U.S.C.A. s
1360 note, provided a way in which the
State of Washington could acquire
jurisdiction over the reservation by
meeting certain conditions prescribed there
by Congress. See Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217, 222, note 10, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3
L.Ed.2d 251. These conditions have not as
yet been met with respect to the Colville
Reservation.
FN14. See, e.g., 54 I.D. 559; 59 I.D. 147;
60I.D. 318.
[5] Counsel for the State of Washington present
two alternative contentions which, if sound, would
sustain the jurisdiction of the State over the land
here in question even if the Act of 1906 did not
completely dissolve the reservation in the manner
held by the Washington courts. The first of these
rests upon the assertion that the particular parcel of
land upon which this burglary was committed is
held under a patent in fee by a non-Indian. The
contention is that, even though the reservation was
not dissolved completely by the Act permitting
non-Indian settlers to come upon it, its limits would
be diminished by the actual purchase of land within
it by non-Indians because land owned in fee by
non-Indians cannot be said to be reserved for
Indians. This contention is not entirely implausible
on its face and, indeed, at one time had the support
of distinguished commentators on Indian Law.
[FN 15] But the issue has since been squarely put to
rest by congressional enactment of the currently
prevailing definition of Indian country in s 1151 to
include 'all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction *358 of the
United States government, notwithstanding the
issuance of any patent * * *.'
FN15. See, e.g., Cohen, Handbook of
© 2005 Thomson/West. No
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Federal Indian Law, 359 (1942). Of course
this work was compiled before the 1948
amendment which enacted the present
definition of Indian country as set out in 18
U.S.C. s 1151, 18 U.S.C.A. s 1151.
[6] The State urges that we interpret the words
'notwithstanding the issuance of any patent' to mean
only notwithstanding the issuance of any patent to
an Indian. But the State does not suggest, nor can
we find, any adequate justification for such an
interpretation. Quite the contrary, it seems to us
that the strongest argument against the exclusion of
patented lands from an Indian reservation applies
with equal force to patents issued to non-Indians
and Indians alike. For that argument rests upon the
fact that where the existence or nonexistence of an
Indian reservation, and therefore the existence or
nonexistence of federal jurisdiction, depends upon
the ownership of particular parcels of land, law
enforcement officers operating in the area will find
it necessary to search tract books in order to
determine whether criminal jurisdiction over each
particular offense, even though committed within
the reservation, is in the State or Federal
Government. [FN 16] Such an impractical pattern
of checkerboard jurisdiction was avoided by the
plain language of s 1151 and we see no justification
for adopting an unwarranted construction of that
language where the result would be merely to
recreate confusion Congress specifically sought to
avoid.
FN 16. Objection to the possibility of such
an
administratively
unworkable
distribution of criminal jurisdiction has
been voiced by the Solicitor of the
Department of Interior. 61 I.D. 298, 304.
And see United States v. Frank Black
Spotted Horse, 8 Cir., 282 F. 349, 3 5 3 354.
[7] The second alternative contention pressed by
the State of Washington rests **429 upon the fact
that the land on which the burglary occurred is
located within the governmental townsite of Omak,
a town laid out by the Federal Government pursuant
to authority granted in s 11 of the 1906 Act. The
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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State contends that when this authorized townsite
plot was filed for record in Okanogan County, *359
all the lands encompassed within the townsite were
thereby dedicated to the public interest and, since
this dedication to the public is inconsistent with any
reservation for the Indians, all these lands became
subject to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by
the courts of Washington. This contention is
nothing more than a variation of the State's first
alternative contention for it simply attempts to make
a special case for excluding from a reservation
lands owned by towns as opposed to lands owned
by individual non-Indians. The arguments which
led us to reject the State's first alternative
contention, though present only with somewhat less
force here, are nonetheless entirely adequate to
require the same answer to this contention.
Moreover, the State can point to no language in s
1151's definition of Indian country which lends the
slightest support to the idea that by creating a
townsite within an Indian reservation the Federal
Government lessens the scope of its responsibility
for the Indians living on that reservation.

368 U.S. 351, 82 S.Ct. 424, 7 L.Ed.2d 346
END OF DOCUMENT

[8] [9] In United States v. Celestine, [FN 17] this
Court said that 'when Congress has once
established a reservation, all tracts included within
it remain a part of the reservation until separated
therefrom by Congress.' We are unable to find
where Congress has taken away from the Colville
Indians any part of the land within the boundaries of
the area which has been recognized as their
reservation since 1892. Since the burglary with
which petitioner was charged occurred on property
plainly located within the limits of that reservation,
the courts of Washington had no jurisdiction to try
him for that offense.
FN17. 215 U.S. 278, 285, 30 S.Ct. 93, 95,
54 L.Ed. 195.
The judgment of the Washington Supreme Court
denying petitioner's plea for a writ of habeas corpus
is therefore reversed and the cause is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellant,
v.
Nelson E. "Buck" SANFORD et al., Appellees.
No. 73-3016.

by hunting guides accompanying undercover agents.
18U.S.C.A. §1165.
[2] Indians €^>36
209k36 Most Cited Cases
Statute prohibiting going upon Indian reservation
for purpose of hunting or fishing extended to
activities of hunting guides. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1165.

Dec. 23, 1976.
The United States District Court for the District of
Montana, James F. Battin, J., dismissed an
indictment against defendants charging game law
violations and the Court of Appeals, 503 F.2d 291,
dismissed a Government appeal. The Supreme
Court, 421 U.S. 996, 95 S.Ct. 2392, 44 L.Ed.2d 663,
vacated the dismissal. A subsequent order of the
Court of Appeals, 536 F.2d 871, again dismissing
the appeal, was reversed by the Supreme Court, 97
S.Ct. 20, 50 L.Ed.2d 17. On remand, the Court of
Appeals, Sneed, Circuit Judge, held that the statutes
prohibiting trespass on Indian reservations for
hunting and fishing and prohibiting hunting in
Yellowstone National Park applied to hunting
guides; that if government undercover agents were
not authorized by Montana officials to violate that
state's game laws in attempting to gain evidence
against defendants, interstate transportation of
animals killed by the agents in violation of Montana
law could constitute a violation of the Lacey Act;
and that the defendants could be convicted of
conspiring to transport in interstate commerce parts
of the dead bodies of illegally killed animals.
Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes
[1] Indians €=^36
209k36 Most Cited Cases
Participation of government undercover agents in
illegal hunting on Indian reservation did not make
lawful what would otherwise be unlawful trespass

[3] Indians € ^ 3 6
209k36 Most Cited Cases
Statute prohibiting going upon Indian reservation
for purpose of hunting or fishing did not make
illegal unauthorized killing of wildlife on Indian
reservations and thus could not serve as predicate
offense for conviction under Lacey Act, which
prohibited transportation of wildlife killed in
violation of federal laws. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 43, 1165.
[4] Indians € ^ 3 6
209k36 Most Cited Cases
Montana game laws apply to
non-Indians on Indian reservations.

of

[5] Game €=^7
187k7 Most Cited Cases
Montana statute prohibiting hunting and fishing out
of season did not apply to activities of hunting
guides. R.C.M.1947, § 26-307(3).
[6] Criminal Law €=^36.6
110k36.6 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 110k36.5, 110k31)
Federal Government's authorization of undercover
agents to violate federal game laws for purposes of
gathering evidence of game law violations by
hunting guides did not immunize undercover agents
from force and effect of state game laws.
[7] Constitutional Law €=>257.5
92k257.5 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k257)
Government undercover agents' participation in
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illegal hunting expedition to gain evidence of game
law violations by hunting guides did not violate due
process.
[8] Game €=>7
187k7 Most Cited Cases
If federal undercover agents were not authorized by
Montana officials to violate that state's game laws in
attempting to gather evidence of federal game law
violations
by
hunting
guides,
interstate
transportation of wildlife illegally killed in Montana
by undercover agents could violate Lacey Act. 18
U.S.C.A. § 43; R.C.M.1947, §§ 26-904, 26-906.
[9] Game €=^7
187k7 Most Cited Cases
Statute prohibiting hunting in Yellowstone National
Park applied to activities of hunting guides as well
as hunters themselves. Yellowstone National Park
Act of 1894, § 4, 16 U.S.C.A. § 26.
[10] Conspiracy €=^28(3)
91k28(3) Most Cited Cases
If hunting guides, on belief that federal undercover
agents were bona fide hunters, conspired to
transport in interstate commerce parts of animals
killed in violation of federal law by undercover
agents, hunting guides could be convicted of
conspiracy, notwithstanding ultimate success or
failure of planned scheme. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 43, 371.
[11] Conspiracy €==>27
91k27 Most Cited Cases
It is not necessary that overt acts in furtherance of
conspiracy be criminal in nature. 18 U.S.C.A. § 371
*1086 Keith L. Burrowes, Asst. U. S. Atty.
(argued), Billings, Mont., for appellant.
Ralph S. Wright and D. Frank Kampfe (argued), of
Sandall, Moses & Cavan, Billings, Mont., for
appellees.
Before MERRILL, TRASK and SNEED, Circuit
Judges.
SNEED, Circuit Judge:

This opinion marks the third time we have sought
to dispose of this case. Trial on a seven-count
indictment against Nelson Sanford and his sons,
Rodney, Lon and Rick Sanford began on February
5, 1973. A mistrial resulted by reason of a hung
jury. The district court then granted the Sanfords'
motion to dismiss the indictment, and the
Government appeals pursuant to 18 U.S.C. s 3731
from the grant of this motion. We originally held
that this court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal
because the double jeopardy clause prohibited
further prosecution. 503 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1974).
The Supreme Court remanded the case to us "for
further consideration in the light of Serfass v.
United States, 420 U.S. 377, (95 S.Ct. 1055, 43
L.Ed.2d 265) (1975)." 421 U.S. 996, 95 S.Ct. 2392,
44 L.Ed.2d 663 (1975). On remand, we adhered to
our prior determination. 536 F.2d 871 (9th Cir.
1976). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the double jeopardy clause did not prohibit further
prosecution, and remanded the case to us for a
decision on the merits of the district court's
dismissal of the indictment. — U.S. -—, 97 S.Ct.
20, 50 L.Ed.2d 17 (1976). We reverse and remand
for further proceedings on all seven counts.
Because of the rather unique facts presented in this
case, a full statement of the allegations set forth in
the indictment is necessary. Well-pleaded factual
allegations are assumed to be true.
The Sanfords are engaged in the business of
outfitting and guiding big game hunts in Montana.
Rodney Sanford telephoned Paul Bagalio at
Bagalio's home in Vermont on December 22, 1971.
During this conversation, Rodney offered his
services as a guide for late season elk and Rocky
Mountain Big Horn sheep hunting in Montana. A
second conversation to the same effect was held on
December 29 at which time the hunts at issue in this
case were arranged. Subsequently, Bagalio
telephoned Rodney and obtained permission to
bring along Bruce Parker, who Bagalio described as
"a friend and business associate."
The Sanfords were unaware that both Bagalio and
Parker were acting in undercover capacities for the
Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife and were
authorized by federal officials to do whatever was
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necessary to complete their investigations.[FN 1]
FN1. Although the facts as alleged in the
indictment do not indicate that Bagalio and
Parker were acting
in undercover
capacities, the Government concedes that
they were authorized by federal officials
"to do whatever necessary to complete
their investigation." It is therefore
appropriate to consider this authorization
in testing the sufficiency of the indictment.
See, e. g., United States v. Thompson, 202
F.Supp. 503 (N.D.CaL, 1962). Appellees
and the district court indicated that a
similar authorization was made by
appropriate officials of the State of
Montana; however, there is no indication
in the Record that the Government has
stipulated the nature, scope and extent of
state authorization.
Bagalio and Parker arrived in Montana early in
January 1972. On January 6, they were transported
by Lon, Rick and Rodney Sanford from Bridger,
Montana to Greybull, Wyoming, where they
secured lodging *1087 for the night. The next
morning, the party of five boarded a helicopter and
were transported to the Crow Indian Reservation in
Montana. At this time, they penetrated the
boundaries of the Reservation in search of elk.[FN2]
Parker, at the direction of Rodney Sanford, shot at
and knocked down a bull elk; the coup de grace was
administered
by
Rodney
Sanford.
Shortly
thereafter, Rick Sanford returned by helicopter and
transported the party and the cape of the elk from
the Reservation back to Greybull, Wyoming. The
cape was then carried by Lon, Rick and Rodney
Sanford to Bridger, Montana. Bagalio and Parker
apparently joined the Sanfords in Montana on
January 10.
FN2. Rick, who had left in the helicopter,
and Nelson Sanford were not with the
party.
A second hunt was planned but first postponed
because of inclement weather. The expedition
finally got under way on February 2, 1972. At this
© 2005 Thomson/West. No

time, Bagalio, Parker and Rodney Sanford again
penetrated the exterior boundaries of the Crow
Indian Reservation. At the direction of Rodney
Sanford, Bagalio shot and killed a second elk.
Rodney caped the elk, and the party, leaving the
carcass behind, left the Reservation.
Within the next five days, Rodney Sanford guided
Bagalio and Parker on a hunt for Rocky Mountain
Big Horn sheep. Rodney led the party into
Yellowstone National Park, where he pointed out a
sheep for Bagalio to shoot. Bagalio shot and killed
the sheep. Rodney removed the cape, head and
horns from the sheep, leaving the carcass where it
fell.
[1] A seven-count indictment was returned against
the Sanfords. In Count I Nelson, Rodney, Lon and
Rick were charged under 18 U.S.C. ss 2, 43, and
371 with conspiracy to transport in interstate
commerce animals killed in violation of R.C.M. s
26-307(3) and 16 U.S.C. s 26. Count III charged
Lon and Rodney Sanford with the January 8 illegal
entry on the Crow Indian Reservation, 18 U.S.C. s
1165, and further charged Nelson and Rick Sanford
with aiding and abetting the commission of the
offense, 18 U.S.C. s 2. Count III charged Rodney
Sanford for a similar offense with respect to the
February 2 entry onto the Crow Indian Reservation;
Nelson, Rick and Lon Sanford were charged with
aiding and abetting this offense. Count IV charged
Rodney Sanford with illegal hunting within
Yellowstone National Park, 16 U.S.C. s 26. The
remaining three counts concerned alleged violations
of the Lacey Act, 18 U.S.C. s 43. In Count V,
Rodney, Lon and Rick were charged with interstate
transportation of the elk killed on January 8; the elk
was said to have been killed in violation of federal,
18 U.S.C. s 1165, and state, R.C.M. s 26-307(3),
laws. Count VI made the same charge against
Rodney Sanford with respect to the elk killed on
February 2. Finally, Count VII made an identical
charge against Nelson Sanford for the transportation
of parts of the bodies of the two dead elk from
Billings, Montana, to Seattle, Washington; Rodney,
Lon and Rick Sanford were charged with aiding and
abetting the commission of this offense.
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Our consideration of the sufficiency of the
indictment will focus: first, on Counts II and III,
relating to the alleged trespass on the Crow Indian
Reservation; second, on Counts V, VI and VII,
relating to the alleged violations of the Lacey Act;
third, on Count IV, relating to hunting within
Yellowstone National Park; and, fourth, on Count I,
relating to conspiracy to transport illegally killed
animals in interstate commerce.
Counts II and III: Trespass on Crow Indian
Reservation.
Turning to the portions of the indictment charging
appellees with illegal trespass on the Crow Indian
Reservation, 18 U.S.C. s 1165 proscribes
unauthorized entry onto an Indian reservation for
the purpose of hunting, trapping, or removal of
game.[FN3] *1088 The district court dismissed
Counts II and III on the ground that the trespass was
effectively authorized by Bagalio and Parker. We
disagree.
FN3. "Whoever, without lawful authority
or permission, willfully and knowingly
goes upon any land that belongs to any
Indian or Indian tribe . . . and either are
held by the United States in trust or are
subject to a restriction against alienation
imposed by the United States, or upon any
lands of the United States that are reserved
for Indian use, for the purpose of hunting,
trapping, or fishing thereon, or for the
removal of game, peltries, or fish
therefrom, shall be fined not more than
$200 or imprisoned not more than ninety
days, or both, and all game, fish, and
peltries in his possession shall be
forfeited." 18 U.S.C. s 1165.
We need not pass on the authority of the federal
agents to enter the Crow Reservation under the facts
alleged in this case, for even assuming that the entry
of Bagalio and Parker was lawful, we find nothing
in these facts which would warrant a conclusion
either that the agents could lawfully authorize
appellees to enter the Reservation or that in fact
such authorization was given. The facts as set forth
© 2005 Thomson/West. No

in the indictment suggest that the Sanfords were the
prime motivating force in the entry and that Bagalio
and Parker did little more than follow the
instructions of their guides. The participation of the
undercover agents in the adventure does not, as the
district court suggests, constitute an authorization
nor in any other manner make lawful what would
otherwise be an unlawful trespass by appellees. See
United States v. Gonzales, 539 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir.
1976).
[2] We are also unable to accept the argument that
18 U.S.C. s 1165 does not extend to the activities of
guides, who presumably are not actively engaged in
the shooting of animals. On the contrary, the statute
is written in the broadest possible terms and was
designed to prevent encroachments on Indian lands
of the type presented in this case. It would clearly
violate the intent of Congress to read the statute as
not governing the entries of hunting guides.
Counts V, VI and VII: Interstate Transportation of
Animals Killed in Violation of Federal and State
Law.
Appellees are charged under the Lacey Act, 18
U.S.C. s 43, with three counts of interstate
transportation of illegally killed animals: Count V
charges Rodney, Lon and Rick Sanford with
interstate transportation of "parts of the dead elk
killed on January 8, 1972; Count VI charges
Rodney Sanford with interstate transportation of
"parts of the dead elk killed on February 2, 1972;
Count VII charges Nelson Sanford with interstate
transportation of the above from Billings, Montana
to Seattle, Washington, and further charges the
remaining Sanfords with aiding and abetting the
transportation. [FN4]
FN4. No Lacey Act charges are made with
respect to the Rocky Mountain Big Horn
sheep killed in Yellowstone National Park.
The Lacey Act proscribes the transportation of
wildlife killed in violation of federal laws and the
interstate transportation of wildlife killed in
violation of state laws.[FN5] Thus, the inquiry
under this portion of the indictment is directed to
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Page 5

547 F.2d 1085.
547 F.2d 1085
(Cite as: 547 F.2d 1085)
whether the elk which were transported were killed
in violation of either federal or state laws.
FN5. 18 U.S.C. s 43 provides, inter alia:
(a) Any person who
(1) delivers, carries, transports, or ships,
by any means whatever, or causes to be
delivered, carried, transported, or shipped
for
commercial
or
noncommercial
purposes or sells or causes to be sold any
wildlife taken, transported, or sold in any
manner in violation of any Act of Congress
or regulation issued thereunder, or (2)
delivers, carries, transports, or ships, by
any means whatever, or causes to be
delivered, carried, transported, or shipped
for
commercial
or
noncommercial
purposes or sells or causes to be sold in
interstate or foreign commerce any wildlife
taken, transported, or sold in any manner
in violation of any law or regulation of any
State or foreign country;...
(f) For the purpose of this section, the term
(5) "taken" means captured,
collected, or otherwise possessed.

killed,

[3] To establish an illegal killing under federal law,
the Government urges that 18 U.S.C. s 1165 makes
illegal the unauthorized killing of wildlife on Indian
reservations. We disagree and find persuasive the
reasoning of the Montana Supreme Court:
*1089 It is significant to note that section 1165
does not directly prohibit hunting and fishing but
makes the act of going upon the Indian
reservation a violation if done for the purpose of
hunting or fishing . . . (S)ection 1165 must be
considered to be a statute providing a penalty for
trespass to an Indian reservation and not an
attempt by Congress to enter the field of fish and
game regulation.
State v. Danielson, Mont., 427 P.2d 689, 691
(1967).
[4] Turning to state law, the Government also
argues that the elk were killed in violation of the
Montana fish and game law, R.C.M. s 26-307(3).

This, of course raises the preliminary issue of
whether the Montana game laws apply to the
activities of non-Indians on Indian reservations.
We hold that they do. In reaching this
determination, we again accept as a correct
statement of the law the decision of the Montana
Supreme Court in State v. Danielson, supra,
wherein it was noted that:
(T)he State of Montana has jurisdiction to enforce
its fish and game regulations on Indian
reservations contained within its boundaries with
respect to persons who are not tribal Indians
unless precluded from doing so by an act of
Congress or unless such enforcement would
interfere with self-government on the reservation.
427 P.2d at 692-93.
As mentioned above, 18 U.S.C. s 1165 does not
represent an attempt by the federal government to
enter the arena of fish and game regulation on
Indian reservations; thus, the federal statute cannot
be viewed as a prohibiting or conflicting act.
Further, we are convinced that the application of
Montana game laws to the activities of non-Indians
on Indian reservations does not interfere with tribal
self-government on reservations. We express no
opinion concerning the possible concurrent
application of tribal law to non-Indians on Indian
reservations under the circumstances of this case.
[5] Having determined that the Montana game laws
are applicable, the issue becomes whether the elk
were killed in violation of R.C.M. s 26-307(3),
[FN6] which provides:
FN6. In neither its briefs nor during oral
argument did the Government choose to
argue that other provisions of the Montana
fish and game laws may be applicable to
the activities of the Sanfords. Thus,
although Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 7(c)(3) provides that omission
of a statutory citation is not per se grounds
for dismissal of the indictment, we decline
to review the Montana Code in a search for
possible violations when the Government
places sole reliance on R.C.M. s
26-307(3).
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It shall be unlawful and a misdemeanor for any
person during the closed season on any species of
game animal, game bird or fish to take, hunt,
shoot, kill or capture any such game animal or
such game bird or to fish for or catch any such
fish.
Turning first to the activities of appellees, it is our
view that R.C.M. s 26- 307(3) was not designed to
reach the activities of hunting guides. We reach this
conclusion because of the existence of a separate
provision of the Montana Code, R.C.M. s 26-906,
dealing specifically with activities of outfitters and
guides. This section provides:
Any person accompanying a hunting or fishing
party as an outfitter or agent or employee of such
outfitter shall be equally responsible with any
person or party employing him as an outfitter for
any violation of the law; any such outfitter or
employee of such outfitter, who shall willfully fail
to or refuse to report any violation of the law,
shall be liable to the penalties as herein provided.

[6] [7] [8] But this does not end the inquiry, for if it
is established that Bagalio and Parker violated
R.C.M. s 26-307(3), then the violation of state law
necessary for a Lacey Act prosecution will be
established. [FN8] The issue is thus narrowed to a
consideration of whether Bagalio and Parker were
lawfully and properly authorized by state officials
to kill the elk in question; [FN9] if such
authorization is present, then R.C.M. s 26-307(3)
was not violated and the Lacey Act counts of the
indictment must be dismissed for failure to establish
a violation of state law. Authorization by federal
officials will not serve as authorization by state
officials. This follows from the fact that Congress
has not attempted to enact game laws for Indian
reservations
in
Montana.
Under
these
circumstances
federal
authorization
cannot
immunize federal officials from the force and effect
of Montana game laws.

The definition of "outfitter" offered in R.C.M. s
26-904 [FN7] makes it clear that the *1090
Government is incorrect in its contention that the
Sanfords engaged in off-season hunting within the
meaning of R.C.M. s 26- 307(3). Thus, the
indictment fails to allege facts sufficient to establish
a violation of R.C.M. s 26-307(3) by the Sanfords.
FN7. R.C.M. s 26-904 defines "outfitter"
as follows:
For the purpose of this act, the word
'outfitter' shall mean any person . . . who
shall engage in the business of outfitting
for hunting or fishing parties, as the term is
commonly understood, who shall for
consideration provide any saddle or pack
animal or animals or personal service for
hunting or fishing parties, camping
equipment, vehicles or other conveyance
except boats for any person or persons to
hunt, trap, capture, take or kill any game, .
. . or who shall aid or assist any person or
persons in locating or pursuing any game
animal.

FN8. Under the circumstances here
presented, the commission of the state law
violation by undercover agents does not
change the result. The extent of the state
involvement in the crimes does not rise to
the outrageous level contemplated in
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,
491, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 1650, 48 L.Ed.2d 113;
(Powell, J., concurring); id. 425 U.S. 484,
495, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 1652, (Brennan, J,
dissenting) and consequently does not
violate due process. The case is analogous
to those in which the Government agents
supply contraband to an ongoing criminal
enterprise. "(S)uch conduct falls well
within the bounds sanctioned by the
Supreme Court in Hampton." United v.
Gonzales-Benitez, 537 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir.
1976). Compare Greene v. United States,
454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).
FN9. We are aware of no Montana cases
holding that authorization by proper state
officials may vitiate what would otherwise
be an illegal killing by state agents acting
in undercover capacities. The Montana
Fish and Game Commission is, however,
vested
with
the
responsibility
of
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supervising fish and wildlife within the
state. The broad responsibilities given to
the Commission include the power to
enforce the game laws of the state, R.C.M.
s 26-104(2), fix general and special
seasons and bag limits, R.C.M. s 26-104.3,
and establish game refuges, R.C.M. s
26-104.8.
Most
importantly,
the
Commission
"possesses
all
powers
necessary to fulfill the duties prescribed by
law." R.C.M. s 26-104(1). Although the
Commission has not been granted express
authority to create special exceptions for
law enforcement purposes, the broad
powers enumerated above strongly suggest
that it may authorize limited off-season
shootings by government officials if
essential to the performance of a legitimate
law enforcement function.
While the indictment is silent on the question of
state and federal authorizations in this case, the
Government has conceded the extent of federal
authorization, but no similar stipulation has been
made with respect to state authorization. Thus,
remand on the Lacey Act counts of the indictment is
necessary. If on remand it is determined that state
authorization was lawfully effected, Counts V, VI
and VII should be dismissed.
Count IV: Hunting in Yellowstone National Park.
[9] Rodney Sanford is charged with illegal hunting
of Rocky Mountain Big Horn sheep within the
confines of Yellowstone National Park. 16 U.S.C. s
26 provides, inter alia:
All hunting, or the killing, wounding, or capturing
at any time of any bird or wild animal, except
dangerous animals, when it is necessary to
prevent them from destroying human life or
inflicting an injury, is prohibited within the limits
of said park; —
The parties devoted considerable attention in their
briefs and during oral arguments to the issue of
whether Bagalio acted lawfully in shooting and
killing the sheep. In our view, this is a misstatement
of the issue; the appropriate inquiry is instead
© 2005 Thomson/West. No
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whether the language "all hunting, or the killing,
wounding, or capturing . . . of any bird or wild
animal" encompasses the activities of Rodney
Sanford
within
Yellowstone
Park.
More
particularly, the issue is whether 16 U.S.C. s 26
covers the activities *1091 of hunting guides as well
as hunters themselves.[FN 10] We hold that it does.
FN 10. Appellants again argue that
authorization from proper federal officials
vitiates what would otherwise be illegal
acts. Again, we must disagree. There is
nothing in the facts alleged in the
indictment which even remotely suggests
that the authorization, if it existed,
extended to the activities of Rodney
Sanford. Nor may there be said to be an
implied authorization extending from
Bagalio and Parker to Rodney Sanford,
for, as we noted above, the mere presence
of undercover agents does not vitiate what
would otherwise be illegal conduct.
We begin our consideration by noting the broad
language of 16 U.S.C. s 26, which clearly
proscribes two sets of activities: (1) hunting; and (2)
killing, wounding, or capturing of animals. Rodney
Sanford neither killed, wounded nor captured the
sheep; the inquiry is thus whether he "hunted"
within the meaning of the statute. It is our view
that, given the broad wording and purposes of the
statute, the term "hunting" refers to at least two
types of activities. The first of these, which is not
applicable to the activities of Rodney Sanford, may
be generally referred to as abortive attempts to kill,
wound or capture animals. This would, for
example, include the situation where park officials
interrupted the hunt prior to the actual shooting of
game. "Hunting," however, may also include the
search for and pursuit of game. Compare, e. g.,
State v. Meinken, 10 N J . 348, 91 A.2d 721 (1952).
It is this aspect of "hunting" which has special
applicability to the activities of Rodney Sanford.
Prior to the point in time at which game is located,
the guide is the member of the party most directly
concerned with the search for and pursuit of game;
it is for these services that he receives his
compensation and it is this type of activity which 16
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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U.S.C. s 26 was designed to proscribe.
We are untroubled by what may be viewed as a
superficial inconsistency between our interpretation
of R.C.M. s 26-307(3) and 16 U.S.C. s 26. It will
be recalled that our relatively narrow reading of the
Montana provision was influenced by a separate
provision of the state fish and game laws dealing
with the activities of outfitters and guides. We
again emphasize that the Montana Code is quite
specific in its regulation of fish and game; for
example, separate provisions deal with the activities
of outfitters, R.C.M. ss 26-904, 906, the use of
aircraft to locate game, R.C.M. s 26-301, subd. 2,
tagging of game, R.C.M. s 26-202.2(3) and the
waste of game, R.C.M. s 26-307(1). We held only
that the Government's sole reliance on R.C.M. s
26-307(3) to establish a violation of state law was
misplaced. In contrast with the specificity of the
Montana Code, the federal statute is general and
all-inclusive in nature. To read the federal statute
as excluding the activities of hunting guides would
defeat the obvious Congressional intention to
preserve wildlife within Yellowstone National Park.
It is this distinction which explains our differing
treatment of the state and federal statutes.

Craven v. United States,22 F.2d 605, 609 (1st Cir.
1927), cert, denied, 276 U.S. 627, *109248 S.Ct.
321, 72 L.Ed. 739 (1928). The Sanfords allegedly
believed that Bagalio and Parker were bona fide
hunters; it follows therefrom that they conspired to
violate those laws that would have been violated
had their assumption been correct. Ample overt
acts exist and it is not necessary that these overt acts
be criminal in nature. See United States v.
Rabinowich,238 U.S. 78, 86-88, 35 S.Ct. 682, 59
L.Ed. 1211 (1915). The facts alleged in the
indictment, if proven, would establish a conspiracy
under 18 U.S.C. s 371.
We therefore reverse and remand for
proceedings on all counts of the indictment.

further

547 F.2d 1085
END OF DOCUMENT

Count I: Conspiracy to Transport Illegally-Killed
Animals in Interstate Commerce.
[10][11] Count I of the indictment charges
appellees with conspiracy to transport in interstate
commerce parts of the dead bodies of the two elk
and the sheep. The district court dismissed this
count on the ground that appellees cannot be
charged with conspiracy to commit a substantive
crime when the scheme, if completed, does not
constitute an offense against the United States. We
disagree. Apart from the ultimate disposition of the
substantive counts of the indictment charging
interstate transportation of illegally killed animals,
"the crime of conspiracy is complete upon the
agreement to violate the law, as implemented by
one or more overt acts . . ., and is not at all
dependent upon the ultimate success or failure of
the planned scheme." United States v. Thompson,
493 F.2d 305, 310 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 419 U.S.
834, 95 S.Ct 60, 42 L.Ed.2d 60 (1974). See also
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Supreme Court of Montana.
STATE of Montana ex rel. James NEPSTAD,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
Russell L. DANIELSON, C. L. Duffy and Roy G.
Riley, the Sheriff of Big
HornCounty, Montana, Respondents and Appellants.
No. 11139.
Submitted April 11, 1967.
Decided May 12, 1967.
Appeal from order granting writ of habeas corups
entered by the Thirteenth District Court, Big Horn
County, Guy C. Deny, J. The Supreme Court,
Doyle, J., held that statute which provides penalty for
trespass to possessory rights of reservation Indians
does not conflict with fish and game regulation by
state. The Court further held that state enabling act
which provides that Indian lands shall remain under
'absolute jurisdiction and control' of Congress of
United States did not deprive state of jurisdiction
over the killing of two bull elk, by defendant, a nonIndian, on Indian reservation during closed season.
Order granting writ reversed.

West Headnotes
HI States €=>4.4(2)
360k4.4(2) Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 360k4.5, 360k0.5)
Congress may exercise its powers to circumscribe
exercise of state police power by virtue of supremacy
clause of Federal Constitution. U.S.C A.Const. art. 6,
cl.2.
12] States €=>18.3
360k 18.3 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 360k4.14)
State statute may be effectively "pre-empted" by act
of Congress directly inconsistent with state statute or
by clear expression of intention to exclusively occupy
limited field encompassing state statute.
131 Game € ^ 3 . 5
187k3.5 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 187k31/2)
Regulation of elk hunting within borders of state is
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clearly a proper exercise of state's police power.
R.C.M.1947, § § 26-104(15), 26-307(3).
1 £ Indians €==>32.8
209k32.8 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 209k32.5(3), 209k36)
Statute which makes act of going upon Indian
reservation a violation if done for purpose of hunting
or fishing provides a penalty for trespass to Indian
reservation and is not an attempt by Congress to enter
field of fish and game regulation. 18 U.S.C.A. § §
1164,1165.
151 Indians €=>32.7
209k32.7 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 209k32.5(2), 360k4.13)
Statute which provides penalty for trespass to
possessory rights of reservation Indians does not
conflict with fish and game regulation by state.
R.C.M.1947, § § 26-104(15), 26-307(3);
18
U.S.C.A. S 1165.
1 £ Indians €=^>32.7
209k32.7 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 209k32.5(2), 360k4.13)
Fact that it is possible to violate federal statute
providing penalty for trespass to possessory rights of
reservation Indians and state fish and game
regulations by same act or acts does not require
conclusion that there is a conflict between state and
federal law. R.C.M.1947, § § 26-104(15), 26307(3); 18 U.S.C.A. S 1165.
121 Criminal Law €^=>29(4)
110k29(4) Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 110k29)
Under system of dual sovereignty single act may
constitutionally constitute crime against both
sovereigns.
M Indians €=^>32.8
209k32.8 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 209k32.5(3), 209k36)
State enabling act which provides that Indian lands
shall remain under
"absolute jurisdiction and
control" of Congress of United States did not deprive
state of jurisdiction over the killing of two bull elk,
by defendant, a
non-Indian, on Indian reservation, during closed
season. R.C.M.1947, § 26-307; Enabling Act, § 1
etseq.; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1165.
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121 Indians €=^32.7
209k32.7 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 209k32.5(2), 209k36)
State has jurisdiction to enforce fish and game
regulations on Indian reservations contained within
its boundaries with respect to persons who are not
tribal Indians unless precluded from doing so by act
of Congress or unless such enforcement would
interfere with self-government on reservation.
R.C.M.1947, § § 26-104(15), 26-307.
*439 **690 Forrest H. Anderson, Atty. Gen.,
Helena, Robert H. Wilson and Kenneth R. Neill,
Hardin, Chadwick Smith, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen.
(argued), Helena, for appellants.
Lee Overfelt (argued), Billings, for respondent.
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state statute or by a clear expression of an intention to
exclusively occupy a limited field encompassing the
state statute. Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 32 S.Ct.
715, 56 L.Ed. 1182: Schwartz v. State of Texas, 344
U.S. 199. 73 S.Ct. 232, 97 L.Ed. 231.
[3] Regulation of elk hunting within the borders of
the State of Montana is clearly a proper exercise of
the state's police power. Van Camp Sea Food Co. v.
Department of Natural Resources of the State of
California. 9 Cir., 30 F.2d 111, and cases cited; State
v. Rathbone, 110 Mont. 225, 100 P.2d 86. Section
26-104, subd. (15), R.C.M.1947, authorizes the Fish
and Game Commission to exercise the state's power
with respect to setting seasons and fixing bag limits.
Section 26-307, subd. (3), R.C.M.1947, provides that
it is a misdemeanor to hunt game animals during a
closed season.

DOYLE, Justice.
This is an appeal from an order granting a writ of
habeas corpus.
James Nepstad a Non-Indian was arrested and
charged with violating section 26- 307, R.C.M.1947,
by killing two bull elk on the Crow Indian
Reservation during the closed season. The accused
petitioned the district court of the thirteenth judicial
district for a writ of habeas corpus on the theory that
the State of Montana was **691 without jurisdiction
in this matter because *440 the elk were killed on a
Crow Indian Reservation located in south-eastern
Montana.
The district court agreed with the
petitioner and on order was entered April 12, 1966,
granting the writ of habeas corpus releasing him from
the custody of the Big Horn County Sheriff. The
order contained the following statement '* * * It is
elementary that all Indian lands within the State are
under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the
United States. (See the Enabling Act of Montana) In
any event, the Congress, by enacting the statute in
question (Title 18, s 1165) on July 12, 1960,
following the act of our Legislature in 1957, seems
clearly to have pre-empted the field and left the
jurisdiction to punish the petitioner, if he be guilty of
any crime, in the courts of the United States * * * .'
flir21 It is well-settled that the United States
Congress may exercise its powers to circumscribe the
exercise of state police power by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
U.S. Const. Art. VI, Clause 2; Morris v. Jones, 329
U.S. 545, 91 L.Ed. 488, 67 S.Ct. 451, 168 A.L.R.
656. A state statute may be effectively 'pre-empted'
by an act of Congress directly inconsistent with the

The first question presented in this appeal is whether
Congress *441 has pre-empted all state regulation of
fish and game on Indian reservations by enacting
conflicting legislation. Section 1165 of Title 18,
United States Code was the only federal statute cited
as inconsistent and reads as follows:
'Whoever, without lawful authority or permission,
willfully and knowingly goes upon any land that
belongs to any Indian or Indian tribe, band, or group
and either are held by the United States in trust or are
subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by
the United States, or upon any lands of the United
States that are reserved for Indian use, for the
purpose of hunting, trapping, or fishing thereon, or
for the removal of game, peltries, or fish therefrom,
shall be fined not more that $200 or imprisoned not
more than ninety days, or both, and all game, fish,
and peltries in his possession shall be forfeited.' P.L.
86-634, s 2, 74 Stat. 469.
|"4][51 It is significant to note that section 1165 does
not directly prohibit hunting and fishing but makes
the act of going upon the Indian reservation a
violation if done for the purpose of hunting or
fishing. Section 1165 expressly permits hunting and
fishing on Indian reservations without additional
federal regulation if proper permission or
authorization is given for the entry. Therefore,
section 1165 must be considered to be a statute
providing a penalty for trespass to an Indian
reservation and not an attempt by Congress to enter
the field of fish and game regulation.
This
construction is fortified by the section preceding
section 1165 wherein a penalty is provided for the
destruction of boundary signs erected by Indian tribes
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to give notice that hunting, trapping, and fishing on
the reservation is not permitted without lawful
authority or permission. Title 18, s 1164U.S.C. We
hold that a statute which provides a penalty for
trespass to the possessory rights of reservation **692
Indians does not conflict with fish and game
regulation by the State of Montana.
Nothing has been advanced to this court to show that
Congress has expressed an intention to occupy the
field of fish and *442 game management on Indian
reservations, nor would we concede that it could. A
contrary general policy was noted in Organized
Village of Kake v. Egan. 369 U.S. 60. 82 S.Ct. 562, 7
L.Ed.2d 573. In the Kake case the United States
Supreme Court demonstrated by historical discussion
a continuing tendency to relax federal regulation over
Indian affairs by permitting more tribal selfgovernment. A concurrent increase of the influence
of state law on Indian reservations was also noted.
\6)\7] The fact that it is possible to violate section
1165 and Montana fish and game regulations by the
same act or acts does not require the conclusion that
there is a conflict between state and federal law. It
has long been recognized that under our system of
dual sovereignty a single act may constitutionally
constitute a crime against both sovereigns. Bartkus
v. People of State of Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S.Ct.
676. 3 L.Ed.2d 684: Abbate v. U.S.. 359 U.S. 187. 79
S.Ct.666.3L.Ed.2d729.
Since Congress has not acted to exclude all state
regulation of fish and game on Indian reservations
the only remaining question is whether the state's
regulatory power extends to a person who is not a
tribal Indian hunting upon the reservation. This
question is a subdivision of the larger question of
whether the police power of the state may be
extended to persons on Indian reservations who are
not tribal Indians. In this connection respondentNepstad contends in his brief that the State of
Montana is precluded from exercising any regulatory
power over persons on Indian reservations by section
4, second part, of its own Enabling Act which reads
as follows:

£8] The effect of the above-quoted portion of the
Montana *443 Enabling Act was considered in
Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240. 17 S.Ct. 107,
41 L.Ed. 419. upon an appeal from a conviction of
murder alleged to have been committed on an Indian
reservation situated within the boundaries of the State
of Montana. The Draper case followed an earlier U.S.
Supreme Court decision by holding that the retention
of'absolute jurisdiction and control' over Indian lands
did not deprive the State of Montana of jurisdiction
over crimes committed on reservations by other than
Indians or against Indians. In Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251, the United
States Supreme Court declared that absent governing
acts of Congress the test of the applicability of state
law on Indian reservations is whether such
application would interfere with reservation selfgovernment. The most recent statement on this
question appears in the Kake Village case, supra, at
369 U.S. 71, at 82 S.Ct. 568: 'The Senate amendment
was designed simply to make clear what an
examination of past statutes and decisions makes
clear also: that the words 'absolute jurisdiction and
control' are not intended to oust the State completely
from regulation of Indian 'property (including fishing
rights)'. 'Absolute' in s 4 carried the gloss of its
predecessor statutes, meaning undiminished, not
exclusive.'
[9] From the foregoing we conclude that the State of
Montana has jurisdiction to enforce its fish and game
regulations on Indian reservations contained within
its boundaries with respect to persons who are not
tribal Indians unless precluded from doing so by an
act of Congress or unless **693 such enforcement
would interfere with self-government on the
reservation. We have already discussed the absence
of prohibiting or conflicting acts of Congress.
Further, no convincing argument has been made to
show how enforcement of state hunting and fishing
regulations against a non-Indian would in any manner
interfere with self-government of the reservation.
Therefore, we hold that the district court erred when
it decided that State Courts have no jurisdiction over
non-Indians, particularly the respondent.
*444 The order granting the writ is reversed.

'Second. That the people inhabiting said proposed
(State of Montana) do agree and declare that they
forever disclaim all right and title * * * to all lands
lying within the said limits owned or held by any
Indian or Indian tribes; * * * and said Indian lands
shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and
control of the congress of the United States * * * .'

JAMES T. HARRISON, C. J , and ADAIR,
CASTLES and JOHN C. HARRISON, JJ., concur.
149 Mont. 438,427 P.2d 689
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